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Notes
INDIANA'S PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE STATUTE
AND ITS EFFECT ON A CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT
CREDENTIALING: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED
STATUTORY REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
Indiana's peer review privilege statute creates an evidentiary privilege for
information related to the professional qualifications of health care providers in
Indiana, including doctors, dentists, nurses, and other health care professionals.'
As its name implies, the information protected by the statute is acquired during
the process of "peer review." Peer review of physicians is defined as "the
evaluation by practicing physicians of the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness
of services ordered or performed by other physicians."2 In a hospital setting,
peer review is usually carried out in committees, which are composed of
members of that hospital's medical staff.3 The responsibilities of peer review
committees vary, but they typically include the task of determining which
physicians are worthy of hospital staff privileges.4 To perform this function,
hospital peer review committees initially screen the professional qualifications
of physicians who apply for hospital staff privileges and periodically review
those qualifications.'
Advocates of the peer review process assert that because the medical
profession is highly specialized, physicians and other health care professionals
possessing medical expertise are best qualified to evaluate the performance of

1. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-1 to -4 (West Supp. 1992). For a partial text of the
statute, see infra note 84.
2. WILLIAM P. ISELE, THE HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF:
ITS LEGAL RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 126 (1984). Although peer review is performed on many types of health care
providers, the focus of this note is the application of Indiana's peer review privilege statute to the
review of physicians who are independent contractors in Indiana hospitals.
3. See Randall E. Butler, Records and Proceedingsof Hospital Committees PrivilegedAgainst
Discovery, 28 S. TEX. L.J. 97, 100-01 (1987).
4. The peer review committee that performs this function is typically called the credentialing
committee. Id. at 100.
5. Id.
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other health care providers. 6 Nonetheless, as concerned as physicians should
be with assuring that they are delivering quality medical care, physicians have
been reluctant to participate on peer review committees. 7 Physicians have
feared that negative opinions or criticisms voiced against another physician may
result in resentment, loss of referrals, or litigation once those criticisms are
exposed."
In an effort to encourage physicians to participate candidly and openly in
the peer review process, most states have enacted peer review privilege statutes.
These statutes typically protect peer review documents and discussions from
discovery9 and grant the committee members immunity" for action taken while

6. See Arthur F. Southwick & Debors A. Slee, Quality Assurance in Health Care:
Confidentiality of Information and Immunity for Participants, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 343 (1984),
reprinted in ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION

623 (2d ed. 1988) ("The theory is that peers are in the best position to judge each other, and self
criticism has been found to be a useful educational and quality management tool."). See also
Christopher S. Morter, Note, The Health Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find
Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115 (1988).
7. One physician has stated:
Since the beginning of recorded time, it has been axiomatic that professional
organizations and societies have been reluctant to criticize members of their own
societies or groups .... Physicians and health care providers are no exception to this
rule, and for years there has been widespread criticism of the medical profession for an
undeclared "conspiracy of silence" to protect those individuals within the ranks who are
incompetent or derelict in their duties.
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 5110 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment of the House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1986) (statement of Wayne W. Alberts, M.D., Medical Director, Capitol
Area Permanente Medical Group, P.C.).
8. For a discussion of these fears, see infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
9. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-24-58 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.23.030, 18.23.070 (1991);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445.01 (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-9-304, 20-9-503
(Michie 1991); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-17b
(West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 24, § 1768 (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505
(Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.101 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-133,
(Michie 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 624-25.5 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-1393 (Supp. 1993);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, para. 5/8-2101 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.62 (West Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.135 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-4915 (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.377 (Baldwin Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.3715.3 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3296 (West Supp. 1992);
MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-503 (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I1l, §§ 204, 205
(West Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21515 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145.64 (West Supp. 1993); MISs. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.035
(Vernon 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-201 to -205 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-2046 to 2048 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.265 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
329:29 (Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.8 (West Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
41-9-5 (Michie 1989); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527(3) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 131E-95 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-01-02.1 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2305.24, 2305.251 (Baldwin 1990); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1709 (West 1984); OR. REV.
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on the committee. By giving the peer review committee members immunity and
making all of their opinions and recommendations confidential, physicians are
encouraged to participate in the peer review process in an open and candid
manner. Thus, the peer review committee, acting within the protection of the
privilege, is more willing to speak out against an incompetent peer. As a result,
the quality of medical care is improved."
Indiana's peer review privilege statute was created in 1977. 2 The statute

§ 41.675 (Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 425.2, 425.4 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN.
§ 5-37.3-7 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-71-10, 40-71-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-4-26.1 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-219 (Supp. 1992); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495(b) (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-25-1, 26-25-3
(Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1443 (Supp. 1993) VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(Michie
1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.240 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (1991); WiS.
STAT.
LAWS

STAT. ANN § 146.38 (West 1989). For a general discussion on the peer review privilege, see
Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Discovery of Hospital'sInternal Records or Communications as to
Qualifications or Evaluations of Individual Physician, 81 A.L.R.3d 944 (1977 & Supp. 1990).
10. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-333 (Supp. 1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445.02 (Supp.
1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §20-9-502 (Michie 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36.5-105 (West
1990 & Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-17b (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 24, § 1768 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.101 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-7-132 (Michie 1991); HAW. REv. STAT. § 671D-10 (Supp. 1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
210, para 85/10.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-10-1-6.5, 34-4-12.6-4 (West Supp.
1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.135 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-442
(1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.3 (West 1991); MD. HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-504
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.25 (Baldwin 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 25-28
(West Supp. 1993); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 425.3 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-371.5 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §36-4-25 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219 (Supp.
1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §26-25-1 (Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 26, §1442 (1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.250 (West 1988); W. VA.
CODE § 30-3c-2 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146-37 (West 1989).
Issues surrounding both immunity and confidentiality present themselves in the context of the
peer review privilege.
However, this note focuses on the confidentiality provisions.
A
comprehensive discussion of the immunity provisions is therefore beyond the scope of this note.
II. See the landmark decision of Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc, 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C.
1970), motion reargued and denied, 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C. 1970), and afd mem., 479F.2d 920
(D.C.Cir. 1973) (holding that "candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua
non of adequate hospital care," and that a plaintiff may not discover peer review records absent
exceptional circumstances). See also Gregory G. Gosfield, Comment, Medical Peer Review
Protection in the Health CareIndustry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552 (1979). Gosfield identifies two premises
that support the granting of immunity and privilege to peer review committees. First, special
privileges and immunities result in increased peer review activity, and second, increased peer review
results in the improvement of medical care. Id.at 552. Gosfield also suggests that if one of these
premises is proved false, the justification for special treatment for the peer review committee is
untenable. Id.
12. One court has explained,
ITihe purpose of the peer review privilege is to foster an effective review of medical
care. An effective review requires that all participants to a peer review proceeding
communicate candidly, objectively, and conscientiously. Absent the protection of a
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encourages participation in peer review by assuring confidentiality 3 and
providing immunity 4 to the physicians who serve on the committee. While the
peer review privilege has admirable objectives, 5 the operation of the statute
has a drastic effect on a plaintiff who sues a hospital on the theory of "negligent
credentialing." A plaintiff in a negligent credentialing suit alleges in effect that
a hospital negligently screened or reviewed the professional qualifications of one
of its staff physicians who, as a result of incompetence, injured the patientplaintiff.16 Because the hospital peer review committee has the primary
responsibility for overseeing the credentialing process, 7 a hospital's peer review
records contain all of the evidence needed to prove a negligent credentialing
claim.'" Therefore, the peer review privilege denies a plaintiff that asserts a
negligent credentialing claim access to much needed evidence.
In addition to its effect on a negligent credentialing claim, Indiana's peer
review privilege can be criticized in several respects. First, self-policing may
result in a "conspiracy of silence" in which health care providers are reluctant
to criticize their peers. 9 In addition, the courts construing the peer review

privilege, the candor and objectivity of peer review communications and the
effectiveness of the peer review process would be hindered. Thus, the peer review
privilege provides protection by granting confidentiality to all communications,
proceedings, and determinations connected with a peer review process.
Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1311 (Ind. App. 1988).
13. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West Supp. 1992). For a partial text of the statute,
see infra note 84.
14. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-3 (West Supp. 1992).
15. See supra note 12.
16. Suits arising from the grant or retention of hospital privileges are termed "negligent
credentialing" suits. See Richard L. Griffith & Jordan M. Parker, With Malice Towards None: The
Metamorphosisof Statutory and Common Law ProtecdonsforPhysiciansandHospitals in Negligent
Credentialing Litigation, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 157 (1991). For purposes of this note, negligent
credentialing will refer to both negligently granting initial staff hospital privileges and negligently
renewing hospital privileges once a physician has become a member of the hospital staff.
17. See Reed E. Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedingsand Reports: TheirLegal Status, 1 AM.
J.L. & MED. 245, 248-49 (1975).
18. A lack of evidence is not problematic in the typical malpractice case where a plaintiff sues
an individual physician. In these malpractice cases, the plaintiffs have access to their own medical
records, which will supply much of the evidence necessary to prove malpractice. See IND. CODE.
ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West Supp. 1992) (allowing patients to receive copies of their own medical
records once they give appropriate authorization).
For a discussion of how negligent credentialing suit plaintiffs can overcome their proof
problems by using alternatives to peer review records, see generally, Susan Ward, Comment,
CorporateNegligence Actions Against Hospitals-Canthe PlaintiffProve a Case?, 59 WASH. L.
REV. 913, 924-25 (1984).
One of the boldest challenges to the idea that the peer review privilege should be applicable
to a negligent credentialing suit can be found in B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege:
A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 153 (1984).
19. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at160-61.
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statutes have given a broad interpretation to the privilege in favor of
confidentiality.' This broad interpretation allows hospitals litigating negligent
credentialing cases to shield evidence that arguably should be discoverable. 2'
Indiana's statute also contains general descriptions of privileged peer review
materials and does not differentiate between materials that are purely factual and
materials that contain committee opinions and evaluations.'
For example,
hospitals may shield evidence unrelated to committee opinions and deliberations,
such as the date of a physician's last review and the criteria used to determine
if staff privileges should be granted.' If the purpose of creating the privilege
was to protect opinions of the committee members from discovery, applying the
privilege to non-opinionated material is an abuse of the privilege. Last, while
malpractice plaintiffs are denied access to peer review materials, hospitals and
physicians may gain access and use peer review materials to their advantage.'
Even after a hospital has revealed peer review records to a physician under
review or after peer review records have been disclosed to the public, a plaintiff
still may not use the information against a hospital. Once the physician under
review and the general public know the opinions of the peer review committee,
the need for a continued privilege is minimal. However, Indiana's privilege
statute denies the discovery and use of the records even after their widespread
exposure.
This Note proposes a statutory revision that will protect the peer review
process by affording physicians serving on the committee adequate assurances
of confidentiality, while also allowing a plaintiff in a negligent credentialing suit
to obtain necessary evidence. Part II of this Note discusses the origins of peer
review, the peer review privilege, and hospital liability for negligent
credentialing to provide a background against which Indiana's peer review
privilege statute can be analyzed.' Next, Part III examines the criticisms of
the peer review process in general to emphasize the acceptability and desirability
of peer review privilege reform.'
Part IV analyzes Indiana's peer review

20. See Ray v. St. John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464, 471 (Ind. App. 1991) ("We
have given a broad interpretation of the scope of the peer review privilege."); Frank v. Trustees of
the Orange County Hosp., 530 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. App. 1088) ("There is no subject matter limit
on the privilege.").
21. See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
22. The language defining which peer review committee materials are privileged states: "[N]o
records or determinations of, or communications to a peer review committee" are discoverable or
admissible. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(h) (West Supp. 1992). For a discussion of the
fact/opinion distinction, see infra part V.A.
23. See infra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
24. See infra parts V.B, V.E.
25. See discussion infra part H.
26. See discussion infra part III.
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privilege statute and then analyzes the case law interpreting the statute. 27 Parts
V and VI examine several criticisms of Indiana's peer review privilege statute,
as well as the inadequacy of alternative means for a plaintiff to acquire
evidence.' s Part VII explores unworkable alternatives to the peer review
statute. Finally, this Note concludes by offering model revisions to Indiana's
current peer review statute." These suggestions are aimed at tipping the scales
more evenly to balance the two competing interests surrounding the peer review
statute: the need to encourage candid peer review and a plaintiffs right to
unfettered and liberal discovery.'
II. IMPORTANT HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A.

The Development of Peer Review

According to the American Medical Association, the use of peer review is
as old as organized medicine itself.3" Peer review was initially created to
combat the poor quality of health care that existed in the early 1900s.32
Although readily accepted by the medical community as an effective way to
improve the quality of medical care, peer review was not extensively
implemented until many years later. 3 The most important development in the
history of peer review came in 1952, when the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)' was formed to monitor
the quality of health care being delivered in hospitals.33 The JCAHO is a
private, not-for-profit agency that voluntarily surveys and accredits various
The JCAHO manual establishes the industry
health care organizations.'
standards for health care and sets forth a requirement that hospital committees

27. See discussion infra part IV.
28. See discussion infra parts V, VI.
29. See discussion infra parts VII, VIII.
30. See Schafer v. Parkview Memorial Hosp., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ind. 1984)
(discussing these two competing interests).
31. Gosfield, supra note 11, at 463 (citing AMA I PEER REVIEW MANUAL foreword at 1
(1972)).
32. See Gosfield, supra note 11, at 554. For an historical overview of the development of peer
review, see id. at nn. 10-39 and accompanying text. See also Haines, HospitalPeerReview Systems:
An Overview, HEALTH MATRIX, Winter 1984-85, at 30; B. Abbott Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitals
and HospitalMedical Staffs to Regulate the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 PAC.
L.J. 55, 66-68 (1982).
33. Morter, supra note 6, at 1116.
34. The ICAHO was formerly called The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH). For an analysis of the JCAHO, see James S. Roberts et al., A History of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 258 JAMA 936 (1987).
35. Beginning in the early 1970s, peer review began to be strongly promoted by the JCAHO.
See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 623.
36. Griffith & Parker, supra note 16, at 170.
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perform various peer review functions.31 Accreditation by the JCAHO is
advantageous to a hospital;' therefore, most hospitals will perform peer review
according to the JCAHO guidelines. 39
To assure that the quality of health care remains high, some states also have
enacted laws requiring hospitals to monitor the quality of both health care and
health care providers.'" Typically, these statutes give the governing board of
a hospital the responsibility of carrying out peer review functions.4 The
governing board then gives responsibility for conducting reviews to peer review
committees, which are composed of members of the medical staff.42

37. Gosfield, supra note 11, at 563-64. For an overview of each committee required by
JCAHO guidelines, see Butler, supra note 3, at 99-101 and Gosfield, supra note 11, at 563-64.
38. For example, JCAHO accreditation evidences that a facility provides quality services,
attracts high quality medical staff, and allows a hospital to participate in the Medicare program.
JCAHO accreditation may also be required for state licensure. See MICHAEL G. MACDONALD ET
AL., HEALTH CARE LAW, § 5.03 [2] (1992).
39. Under the JCAHO guidelines, one of the responsibilities of the "credentialing committee"
is to investigate the credentials of the hospital's medical staff. See Butler, supra note 3, at 99-101.
The committee must investigate the physician's professional competence, judgment, technical skill,
and physical and mental health. Id. at 101. This function assures the hospital and its patients that
the incompetent doctors are denied or revoked hospital privileges, leaving only the competent
physicians to practice medicine. See also Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An
Analysis of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 700 (1991) ("[Peer
review] remains the arena within which the greatest strides toward policing the profession have
occurred because [the hospital] is the locus where physicians can readily observe one another
practicing medicine on a regular basis.").
40. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445 (Supp. 1992); IND. CODE. § 16-10-1-6.5 (West
1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21513(d) (West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2046
(1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-j (McKinney 1985); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 248-18-030
(1980).
41. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445 (Supp. 1992) ("The governing body of each
licensed hospital . . . shall require that physicians admitted to practice in the hospital . . . organize
into committees or other organizational structures to review the professional practices within the
hospital . . . for the purposes of . . . improvement of the care of patients provided in the
institution."); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.21513(a) (West 1992) ("The . . . governing body
of a hospital licensed under this article are: (a) responsible for all phases of the operation of the
hospital, selection of the medical staff, and quality of care rendered in the hospital.").
42. The duty to select competent staff members is a non-delegable duty, and a hospital may be
held liable if one of its committees negligently retains an incompetent physician. See JAMES W.
SMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY § 3.03[2][a], at 3-11 to -12 (1992). See also, Purcell v. Zimbleman,
500 P.2d 335, 341 (Ariz. App. 1972) (holding hospital liable for acts of surgical review committee
as a matter of law); Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971) (holding that
hospitals cannot escape liability for negligently appointing staff members on the ground that the duty
to perform this function lay with the independent contractor members of the staff), aff'd, 189 S.E.2d
412 (Ga. 1972). For a general discussion of a hospital's responsibilities for the appointment of staff
physicians, see Daniel M. Mulholland 111,The CorporateResponsibility of the Community Hospital,
17 U. TOL. L. REv. 343 (1986); ARTHUR F. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH
CARE ADMINISTRATION, 583 (2d ed. 1988); James B. Cohoon, Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of
CorporateHospital Liability, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 383, 389 (1980); SMITH, supra at 3.03.
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The federal government has also recognized the need for effective peer
review on the national level, and, in response, created Professional Standard
Review Organizations. 43 In addition, the federal government recently enacted
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), which established
a national databank containing evidence of physician malpractice.4 Hospital
peer review committees are required to access45 the national databank when
performing periodic peer review of physicians.
As peer review began to gain acceptance, the problems involved with
implementing peer review procedures grew. Ideally, physicians should be
willing to police their own ranks using peer review as a means of improving the
quality of medical care. Unfortunately, ethical and professional responsibility
for the improvement of medical care has not successfully motivated physicians
to serve on peer review committees.4
The peer review procedure, in which physicians review other physicians
with whom they are in professional competition, presented a multitude of
problems. Physicians losing hospital privileges at the hands of a competitor
often struck back with civil suits. As a result, peer review committee members

43. Congress first acted in 1972 by creating Professional Standards Review Organizations
(PSRO). 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1972). PSROs were established to improve the delivery of health care
services in health care facilities that received Medicare, Medicaid, and Maternal and Child Health
Program financing. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (1972).
Dissatisfaction with PSROs arose principally from their lack of cost effectiveness, and PSROs
were phased out slowly beginning in 1982 when Congress established Peer Review Organizations
(PRO). 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1992). The PROs develop norms of care, diagnosis and treatment
typical to local and national norms. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(6)(A) (1992).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 11101-11152(1992).
45. Id. The national databank was created to prohibit physicians from traveling from one state
to another in order to leave tarnished records behind. All insurance carriers, boards of medical
examiners, and health care entities must report to the databank such information as whether any
judgment has been paid on behalf of a physician, whether a physician's license has been revoked or
suspended, and whether a physician's hospital privileges have been revoked, 42 U.S.C. § 11311132 (1992). In addition, all hospitals must access the databank first when deciding whether or not
to grant hospital privileges to a physician, and again every two years following a physician's grant
of hospital privileges. 42 U.S.C. § 11135 (1992). Malpractice plaintiffs with suits against health
care entities can discover information reported to the databank, but only after they show that a health
care entity failed to request information from the databank as required by the HCQIA. 45 C.F.R.
§ 60.11 (1992). For a discussion on the National Practitioner Databank, see Virginia H. Hackney,
The National PractitionerDatabank: A Step Toward More Effective PeerReview, 24 J. HEALTH &
Hosp. L. 201 (1991).
46. Morter, supra note 6, at 1119. The same fear of participating on peer review committees
surfaces in other areas as well. For example, doctors have been reluctant to testify against each
other in civil malpractice cases. However, recently doctors seem slightly more willing to testify
against each other. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 32, at 188 n.50 (5th ed. 1984).
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feared unwanted participation in litigation for defamation, 47 liability for denial
of due process,' liability for malicious interference with business relations, 49
and liability for antitrust violations.' Criticisms of a physician's peers also
often resulted in a loss of referrals from other doctors."' Physicians, as human
beings, also feared loss of acceptance by their peers. 2 In response to these
valid concerns, the judiciary recognized a need to eliminate barriers to effective
peer review, and created the peer review privilege.
B. The Development of the Peer Review Privilege
Initially, the peer review privilege was promulgated through the common

47. See, e.g., Dorn v. Mendelzon, Inc., 242 Cal. Rptr. 259 (Cal. App. 1987); Good Samaritan
Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Simon, 370 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. App. 1979); Matviuw v. Johnson, 388 N.E.2d
795 (Ill.
App. 1979); Hayden v. Foryt, 407 So. 2d 535 (Miss. 1981).
48. See, e.g., Maimon v. Sisters of Third Order, 491 N.E.2d 779 (Ill.
App. 1986); Miller v.
Eisenhower Medical Ctr., 614 P.2d 258 (Cal. 1980); Halberstadt v. Kissane, 273 N.Y.S.2d 601
(1966), aff'd, 294 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1968); Jacobs v. Martin, 90 A.2d 151 (N.J. Super. 1952); Green
v. City of St. Petersburg, 17 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1944).
49. See, e.g., McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., Inc., 597 F.Supp. 899 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
50. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1243 (1988); Tambone v. Memorial Hosp., 825
F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1987); Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984), ceri.
denied,
472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
For a discussion of antitrust litigation and physician credentialing, see Jennifer L. Otto,
Comment, Antitrust Liability in the Context of Medical Peer Review: The Implications of Patrick v.
Burget and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 577 (1990);
William Carlson, Physician CredentialingDecisions and the Sherman Act, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 419
(1988).
51. Physicians who are specialists depend on their colleagues for referrals; therefore, an adverse
recommendation regarding another physician may result in a loss of referrals from that physician.
See Paul L. Scibetta, Note, Restructuring Hospital-PhysicianRelations: Patient Care Quality
Depends on the Health of Hospital PeerReview, 51 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1025, 1034-35 (1990). One
survey revealed that 21% of physicians lost referrals or were antagonized for participating in peer
review. See Morter, supra note 6, at 1119 (citing Owens, Peer Review: Is Testifying Worth the
Hassle?, MED. ECON., Aug. 20, 1984 at 168).
52. See Scibetta, supra note 51, at 1035:
Physicians are human. They tend to develop friendships at their places of work.
Physicians who conduct the review of a colleague's practice often have close personal
ties to that colleague. It is not difficult to surmise the internal conflict that must
accompany the initiation of a proceeding which will be certain to engender animosity
from a personal friend, and may well have serious implications for that friend's career.
See also Timothy S. Jost, The Necessary and ProperRole of Regulation to Assure the Quality of
Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REV. 525, 556-67 (1988) (stating that when a physician must judge other
physicians that he or she works with every day, the physician must resist giving the benefit of the
doubt to a colleague who has committed an error).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 5

420

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

law. 3 However, not every jurisdiction recognized the peer review privilege;
some states applied the privilege while others refused." 5 As a consequence
of the increased use of quality assurance programs and the uncertainty
surrounding the applicability of the common law privilege, state legislatures
began to enact peer review privilege statutes in the 1970s.'
Currently, virtually every state-including Indiana-has enacted a
statutory peer review privilege allowing peer review participants to be open and
candid without the fear of liability or exposure. The statutes generally have two
purposes.'
First, the statute gives immunity to the individual committee
members from personal liability surrounding their peer review activities.59
Second, the privilege protects all of the proceedings, records, and determinations
of the peer review process from discovery and admissibility in any judicial
proceeding.'
With this privilege in place, physicians are assured that any criticisms,

53. The leading case establishing the peer review privilege was Bredice v. Doctors Hospital,
Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C.Cir. 1973). In Bredice, the plaintiff
unsuccessfully sought production of the hospital medical staffs review committee records. In
denying the request, the court recognized that the purpose of the staff review committee was to
improve medical care through self-analysis. Id. at 250. Because self-analysis can only be effective
when candid and conscientious evaluation takes place, the court held that preserving the
confidentiality of peer review records was necessary. Id. at 250. The court went so far as to say
that "[clandid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of adequate hospital
care." Id. at 250. Without a showing of exceptional necessity, the court refused to threaten the
well-being of the review process by allowing discovery of the peer review records. Id. at 250.
54. See Dade County Medical Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117 (Fla. App. 1979) (denying the
discovery of a medical society's ethics committee records because the balance of the public's interest
in encouraging peer review was greater than the plaintiffs grounds for discovery). See also Gillman
v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
55. See Nazareth Literary and Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. Ct. App.
1973) (holding that letters and statements generated by a hospital peer review committee were
discoverable in a suit alleging that the hospital should have known about a physician's
incompetence). See also Gureghian v. Hackensack Hosp., 262 A.2d 440 (N.J. Super. 1970)
(holding that perinatal mortality committee report was discoverable in negligence suit); Davison v.
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 248 N.W.2d 433 (Wis. 1977) (holding that records of hospital
medical staffs executive and tissue committee and records from the department of obstetrics and
gynecology were not protected under common law privilege; decision to create a privilege should
be left for the legislature).
56. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 637.
57. See supra notes 9-10 for a comprehensive citation to state statutes.
58. See Griffith & Parker, supra note 16, at 160; see also Charles D. Creech, Comment, The
Medical Review Committee Privilege: A JurisdictionalSurvey, 67 N.C. L. REV. 179, 180 (1988).
59. For a comprehensive citation to statutes granting immunity to peer review participants, see
supra note 10.
60. For a comprehensive citation to statutes granting confidentiality to peer review records, see
supra note 9.
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committee deliberations, or committee recommendations made during the peer
review process will remain undiscovered by the physician under review. This
assurance encourages physicians to participate in peer review and speak out
against incompetence. The peer review privilege thus effectuates the elimination
of incompetent physicians and the improvement in the overall quality of medical
care. 61
C. The Development of a Negligent Credentialing Cause of Action
During the same time that peer review privilege statutes were being
enacted, some jurisdictions began to recognize a cause of action for negligent
credentialing. 62 Currently, many jurisdictions recognize this cause of action.63
Typically, the courts have held that hospitals must use reasonable care in
choosing which physicians are granted staff hospital privileges, and that hospitals

61. See Maynard v. United States, 133 F.R.D. 107 (D.C.N.J. 1990) (stating that a peer review
privilege statute was designed to improve the quality of medical care by encouraging thorough and
candid medical review process); Bundy v. Sinopoli, 580 A.2d 1101 (N.J. Super. 1990) (holding that
the purpose of peer review is to improve health care, which is a public benefit; revelation of
committee opinions and recommendations would inhibit candor of the peer review committee and
inhibit health care improvement).
62. For an explanation of the term 'negligent credentialing', see supra note 16 and
accompanying text. The most important event in the history of hospital liability for negligent
credentialing occurred when the Illinois Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Darling v.
Charlston Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). The
court in Darling held that a hospital has a duty to its patients to oversee the care given to them by
the hospital's physicians who are acting as independent contractors. Although the holding in Darling
was not extended to hospitals for either negligently hiring or retaining incompetent physicians, the
cases following Darling expanded their holdings to include suits for the negligent hiring or retaining
of physicians. See, e.g., Johnsonv. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
63. See, e.g., Tucson Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Misevich, 545 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1976); Elam v.
College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544 (Colo. App. 1977);
Register v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 377 A.2d 8 (Del. 1977); Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So.
2d 209 (Fla. 1989); Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 186 S.E.2d 307, affd, 189 S.E.2d 412
(Ga. 1972); Darling v. Charlston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (II!. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Iterman v. Baker, 15 N.E.2d 365 (Ind. 1938); Ferguson v. Gonyaw,
236 N.W.2d 543 (Mich. App. 1975); Hull v. North Valley Hosp., 498 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1972);
Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 173
N.W.2d 881 (Neb. 1970); Moore v. Board of Trustees, 495 P.2d 605, cell. denied, 409 U.S. 879
(Nev. 1972); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975);
Raschel v. Rish, 488 N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 1985); Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
Inc., 354 S.E.2d 455 (N.C. 1987); Benedict v. St. Luke's Hosp., 365 N.W.2d 499 (N.D. 1985);
Park N. Gen. Hosp. v. Hickman, 703 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677
P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984); Utter v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213 (W.Va. 1977); Johnson
v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
One commentator has been critical of the fact that while some courts have recognized a
negligent credentialing cause of action, these same courts have crippled a plaintiff's ability to prove
any negligence against a hospital by holding that hospitals may assert the peer review privilege in
suits for negligent credentialing. See Ward, supra note 18, at 921-22.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 5

422

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

must use care in evaluating the physicians who are currently on the hospital's
staff.' Indiana case law also holds that hospitals have a duty to use ordinary
and reasonable care in employing reasonably qualified, reputable, licensed
physicians as independent contractors."
To their distinct advantage, Indiana hospitals utilize peer review committees
to screen the professional qualifications of their medical staffs.' Thus, the
most relevant and pertinent evidence regarding a hospital's critical hiring
decisions is contained in the peer review records. Indiana, by adopting the peer
review privilege statute, has made all of the peer review records unavailable.
For the plaintiff in a negligent credentialing suit, the privilege means that
proving a hospital was negligent for hiring or retaining an incompetent physician
will be very difficult.67 In attempting to gather the necessary evidence to prove
their claims, most plaintiffs seeking discovery of peer review materials will be
confronted with objections to discovery requests based on Indiana's peer review
privilege statute. Making all peer review information privileged may ultimately
have the effect of denying negligent credentialing suit plaintiffs the only evidence
available to prove their claims.'

64. It is generally true that as long as a hospital has acted reasonably by carefully checking and
monitoring its staff, it is likely that the hospital will escape liability. Paul Simonson, Corporate
Negligence: An Evolving Theory of Hospital Liability, in HOSPITAL LIABILITY 1986 (Stephen H.
MacKaufed., 1986). The minimal steps required to escape liability for negligent credentialing may
include conferring with other hospitals where the doctor has had privileges, investigating other
malpractice claims against the physician, or investigating the doctor's reputation in the medical
community. See SMITH, supra note 42, at 3.02[2].
65. See Iterman v. Baker, 15 N.E.2d 365, 370 (Ind. 1938). See also Huber v. Protestant
Deaconess Hosp. Ass'n, 133 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ind. App. 1956). Unfortunately, the case law has
never elaborated on what a hospital must do to fulfill this duty. The Indiana statute that regulates
the appointment of a hospital's medical staff also provides little guidance about a hospital's duty.
The statute only requires that the governing board of a hospital choose physicians based on their
licensure, their performance of patient care, and their standards of care that effectively use hospital
resources. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1-6.5 (West Supp. 1991).
66. The JCAHO requires hospitals accredited by the JCAHO to use peer review committees.
See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. Receipt of Federal Medicaid benefits may also
depend on that hospital having a peer review system. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-7 (1988).
Furthermore, Indiana law holds the governing board of a hospital responsible for the initial and
subsequent grant of privileges to the hospital's physicians. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1-6.5
(West Supp. 1992). The board typically delegates this responsibility to a "peer review committee,"
which is better qualified than the board to evaluate physician competency. See supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text.
67. A negligent credentialing suit plaintiff must prove that the hospital, acting through its peer
review committee, negligently granted hospital privileges to an incompetent physician. See supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
68. See Creech, supra note 58.
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THE EFFICACY OF THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS

The policies supporting the peer review privilege, the need to encourage the
utilization of peer review (by the medical profession and the state and federal
governments), and the JCAHO all suggest that peer review is the most effective
way to monitor the quality of health care being delivered. Peer review, and not
the threat of litigation, has been lauded as the best way to improve the quality
of medical care. However, there are justified misgivings about the efficacy of
the peer review process. 9
Testimony given at hearings before the House of Representatives on the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA)7 revealed that hospitals who
terminate physicians for incompetence often will give those physicians good
references just to be rid of them. 7 Testimony also showed that compared to
the number of impaired physicians,? the number being identified and screened
out is small.
In addition to testimony on the HCQIA, there are several well-documented
cases in which, although a hospital knew of a physician's incompetence, the peer
review system-along with its confidentiality and immunity provisions-failed
to eliminate the physician from the hospital staff. The peer review process has
not effectively dealt with physicians who have negligently performed

69. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 154 ("Regrettably, the widespread adoption of the privilege
cannot be justified in view of its limited benefits and its adverse impact on a patient's ability to show
negligence.").
70. 42 U.S.C. § 11101-111151 (1992). For a cursory discussion of the HCQIA, see supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text. For a thorough analysis of the HCQIA, see Susan L. Homer,
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions, Applications and
Implications, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 455 (1990). See also Adler, supra note 39; Morter, supra note
6.
71. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on H.H. 5110 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House of Rep. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 216 (1986) (statement of Wayne W. Alberts, M.D., Medical Director of
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States). One situation presented before the House
subcommittee involved a pediatrician who was a sex offender, but was still given an honorable
discharge by the Army. Id. This same doctor was then hired by another health care facility that
was never informed about the physician's past behavior. Id.
72. An impaired physician is one who suffers from a substance abuse problem, physical
disability, psychological disorder, or professional incompetence. See supra note 71, at 217.
Although at least 12,500 (3%) of all physicians are believed to be impaired, only 1,500 received
significant disciplinary action in 1984. Supra note 71, at 217. These statistics indicate that the
overwhelming majority of impaired physicians are not being effectively eliminated by the peer
review mechanism.
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surgeries,73 sexually abused their patients during surgery,74 or improperly
handled patient deaths.75
Another example of the ineffectiveness of peer review is the Indiana case
of Walton v. Jennings Community Hospital, Inc.76 In Walton, a staff surgeon
had sexually harassed the nursing staff and had also been indicted for Medicaid
theft while on the staff of Jennings Community Hospital. After investigating the
surgeon's conduct, the peer review committee recommended that his staff
The hospital accepted a settlement in
privileges be immediately revoked.'
which the surgeon agreed to resign if in return the hospital would state that he
had resigned and had never been under investigation by the hospital when the
hospital responded to inquiries from future employers.M
The grant of privilege and immunity to peer review committees was

73. In Gonzaks v. Nork, No. 228566, slip op. 228566 (Super. Ct. Cal., Sacramento County,
Nov. 19, 1973) a hospital was held liable for permitting a physician to remain on the hospital staff
despite a sequence of bad results in 30 cases. Judge Goldberg, who authored the Gonzaks opinion,
attributed the hospital's continual grant of privileges, despite the physician's incompetence, to
inadequate and unused peer review procedures. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 163.
74. In Miofsky v. Super. Court, 703 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1983), a surgeon committed sex crimes
against over 150 of his patients while they were under anesthesia. The results of a private
investigation revealed that the suppression of the surgeon's conduct was motivated by the
institutional tradition that one professional does not openly criticize another professional. See
Goldberg, supra note 18, at 164 (citing SACRAMENTO BEE, July 4, 1979, at A20).
75. See Scott v. Jackson, 596 A.2d 523 (D.C. 1991). The Scott case beganwhen a Washington
Post article reported that eight years earlier, Dr. Scott's surgical privileges had been suspended from
Washington Hospital Center because of several botched operations. Greg Rushford, HospitalHides
Doctor's Record From Patients;Suit Shines Light on Secretive Peer Review, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
23, 1991, at Id. Among those botched operations was the heart surgery of Willard Jackson. Id.
According to the Washington Post article, when Dr. Scott's colleagues began to express
concern over his competence, the hospital cooperated with Dr. Scott's lawyers in destroying
incriminating hospital records. Id. The hospital also agreed to remove personnel file material that
was damaging to Dr. Scott in exchange for Dr. Scott's promise to leave the hospital quietly. Id.
Furthermore, when Dr. Scott applied for privileges at another hospital, Washington Hospital refused
to allow that hospital to see the peer review records accumulated on Dr. Scott. Id.
76. 875 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1989).
77. Id. at 1318.
78. Id. at 1318-19. The court in Walton invalidated the contract because it was against the
public policy sought to be furthered by the Indiana peer review privilege statute. Id. The court
identified the public policy as being the goal of promoting peer review to eliminate incompetent,
unqualified physicians. Id. at 1321-22. Specifically, the court said that the contract would have
required Jennings Hospital to mislead potential employers, because they would not be given the full,
complete, and up-to-date information that they needed to make an informed hiring decision. Id. at
1322-23. The hospital subsequently breached the agreement by revealing Dr. Walton's background
to a credentialing committee member at another hospital where Dr. Walton was seeking employment.
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supposed to eliminate this type of "plea bargaining" by deficient physicians.'
Indiana specifically allows peer review committees to share information with
other committees, giving hospitals notice of a physician's blemished record.'
However, even with the privilege, hospitals and physicians have demonstrated
a willingness to conceal physician incompetency-even from other hospitals-as
the contract in Walton illustrated. Although the hospital breached the contract
and eventually revealed the information, the mere fact that medical professionals
entered into such a contract is an indictment against the medical profession's
willingness to police itself through peer review.
When the peer review process deteriorates, other mechanisms are available
to act as a check on physician incompetency. However, these mechanisms are
not without flaws. The state medical boards are available, but they rely on peer
review committees for most of their information."' In addition, evidence
exposed during HCQIA hearings showed that information about practitioners
with prior misconduct or malpractice never reaches the medical boards.' Most
of the information that state medical boards receive comes not from peer review
committees, but from law enforcement personnel.83 Therefore, the possibility
of a successful and legitimate suit by a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff may
be an additional way to assure that hospitals are- properly performing the peer
review process. However, a legitimate suit against a hospital for negligent
credentialing is not likely to be successful without access to the peer review
committee records.

79. Homer, supra note 70, at 464. The "plea bargaining" problem was also voiced at the open
hearings during the developmental stages of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act. Witnesses
testified that plea bargaining is attractive to both the physician and the hospital because the physician
is not reported or disciplined, and neither party incurs any legal fees. As a result of the bargain,
a new hospital investigating the physician's background will receive censored information from the
old hospital, to the detriment of patients. Id.
80. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(g)-(h) (West Supp. 1992) allows the disclosure of peer
review records from one peer review committee to another.
81. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 5110 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environmentof the House of RepresentativesEnergy and Commerce
Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1986) (statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector General
of Health and Human Services).
82. Id. Indiana requires hospital governing boards to report disciplinary action taken against
physicians. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1-6.5 (West 1991).. Therefore, the general rule of nonreporting may be less of a problem in Indiana.
83. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on H.R. 5540 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 40-41 (1986) (statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector General of Health and Human
Services).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 5

426

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
IV.

[Vol. 27

INDIANA'S PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE STATUTE

A. The Statute
Indiana's peer review privilege statute grants both confidentiality to peer
review materials" and immunity from civil action to peer review committee

84. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West Supp. 1992).
The statute states:
(a)
All proceedings of a peer review committee shall be confidential.
All
communications to a peer review committee shall be privileged communications.
Neither the personnel of a peer review committee nor any participant in a committee
proceeding shall reveal any content of communication to, the records of, or the
determination of a peer review committee outside the peer committee. However, the
governing board of a hospital or professional health care organization may disclose the
final action taken with regard to a professional health care provider without violating the
provisions of this section.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no person who attends a peer review
committee proceeding shall be permitted or required to disclose any information
acquired in connection with or in the course of a proceeding, any opinion,
recommendation, or evaluation of the committee or of any committee member.
(c) Information that is otherwise discoverable or admissible from original sources shall
not be construed as immune from discovery or use in any proceeding merely because
it was presented during proceedings before a peer review committee. A member,
employee, agent of a committee or other person appearing before the committee may
not be prevented from testifying as to matters within the person's knowledge and in
accordance with the other provisions in this chapter. However, the witness cannot be
questioned about this testimony or other proceedings before the committee or about
opinions formed by the witness as a result of committee hearings.
(d) A professional health care provider under investigation shall be permitted at any
time to see any records accumulated by a peer review committee pertaining to the
provider's personal practice. The provider shall be offered the opportunity to appear
before the peer review committee with adequate representation to hear all charges and
findings concerning the provider's practice and to offer rebuttal information. The
rebuttal information shall be a part of the record before any disclosure of the charges
and findings under this chapter is made.
(e) However, if charges are brought against a professional health care provider in a
hospital that, if sustained by the governing board of the hospital, could result in an
action against a physician required to be reported to the medical licensing board under
IC 16-10-1-6.5(b) or a similar disciplinary action against any other health care provider,
the professional health care provider is entitled to one (1) evidentiary hearing before a
peer review committee of the medical staff and (I) additional hearing on appeal before
the governing board of the hospital.
(g) Communications to, the records of, and determinations of a peer review committee
may only be disclosed to:
(1) the peer review committee of a hospital or other health facility;
(2) the disciplinary authority of the professional organization of which the
professional health care provider under question is a member; or
(3) The appropriate state board of registration and licensure which the
committee considers necessary for recommended disciplinary action;
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members.15 Like other states' peer review privilege statutes, it was created to
encourage physicians to openly and candidly participate in the peer review
process.
The statute defines what is considered to be a peer review
committee for purposes of the statute,87 and also contains exceptions that allow
Indiana's
peer review records to be disclosed under certain circumstances.'
confidentiality provision broadly applies to any form of discovery request used

and shall otherwise be kept confidential for use only within the scope of the committee's
work, unless the professional health care provider has filed a prior written waiver of
confidentiality with the peer review committee.
(h) Except in cases of required disclosure to the professional health care provider
under investigation, no records or determinations of, or communications to a peer
review committee shall be:
(1) subject to subpoena or discovery; or
(2) admissible in evidence;
in any judicial or administrative proceeding, including a proceeding under IC 16-9.5-10,
without a prior written waiver executed by the committee.
(i) Except in cases as authorized under this chapter, the evidentiary privileges created
by this section shall be invoked by all witnesses and organizations in all judicial and
administrative proceedings unless the witness or organization first has a waiver of the
privilege, by its chairman, vice chairman, or secretary ...
85. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-3 (West Supp. 1992).
86. Although Indiana does not record any legislative history, the courts have recited the purpose
behind Indiana's peer review privilege statute. See Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Basden,
524 N.E.2d 1306, 1311 (Ind. App. 1988). "IThe purpose of the peer review privilege is to foster
an effective review of medical care. An effective review requires that all participants to a peer
review proceeding communicate candidly, objectively, and conscientiously. Absent the protection
of a privilege, the candor and objectivity of peer review communications and the effectiveness of
the peer review process would be hindered." See also Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373,
392 (7th Cir. 1984): "[Pleer review is essential to the very lifeblood and heartbeat of medical
competency and quality medical care in the State of Indiana and throughout the nation. [The peer
review privilege] encourages competent and qualified physicians to participate in the medical peer
review process, thus assuring the citizens of Indiana that hospital medical staffs are competent,
qualified, and practicing in accord with approved medical standards."; Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp.,
113 F.R.D 677, 678 (N.D. Ind. 1987): "To enable the health care professionals to properly police
their own ranks the Indiana General Assembly enacted [the peer review privilege] ....
87. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-1(c) (West Supp. 1992).
88. The exceptions to the peer review privilege include information that becomes part of the
peer review record but is otherwise discoverable. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(c) (West Supp.
1992). This exception avoids the possibility that public information, such as pending malpractice
claims, would be privileged simply because the information was used by the committee and became
a part of its record. Another exception allows the governing board of a hospital to disclose any final
action taken with regard to a health care provider, such as whether a physician's privileges have
been revoked. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(a) (West Supp. 1992). The committee may also
execute a waiver in writing to lift the privilege, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6(h), (i)
(West Supp.
1992), and may use information obtained in the committee for legitimate internal business purposes,
such as the hospital's own defense. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-4 (West Supp. 1992). Another
exception allows disclosure of peer review materials to other hospital peer review committees, the
disciplinary board of a professional organization, and several state agencies. IND. CODE ANN. § 344-12.6-2(g) (West Supp. 1992). Disclosure to the state attorney general is also permitted. IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(k) (West Supp. 1992).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 5

428

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

to discover what transpired during the committee meetings. Therefore, the
privilege can be asserted in reply to requests for production of documents,"
deposition questions,'" interrogatory questions,9' and trial testimony'e related
to committee proceedings. Unfortunately, the portion of the statute delineating
which peer review committee records are privileged only states that "no records
or determinations of, or communications to a peer review committee" are
admissible or discoverable. 3
This language is very broad because it
encompasses committee "records," a term that possibly includes anything
pertaining to the review process.' However, the Indiana courts have provided
95
litigants with some guidance as to how to apply the privilege.

89. See, e.g., Community Hosps. v. Medtronic, Inc., 594 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. App. 1992); Ray
v. St. John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. App. 1991); Terre Haute Regional Hosp.,
Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1308-09 (End. App. 1988).
90. See, e.g, Frank v. Trustees of Orange County Hosp., 530 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. App. 1988);
Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc., 524 N.E.2d at 1308-09.
91. See, e.g., Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc., 524 N.E.2d at 1308-09.
92. Members serving on the committee may not testify during any judicial proceeding about
anything that transpired during the committee meetings. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-4 (West
Supp. 1992).
93. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(h) (West Supp. 1992).
94. Ray v. St. John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464, 472-73 (Ind. App. 1991), limited
the scope of the privilege to matters involving the review of patient care, the review of a physician's
credentials, and the review of the validity of claims against a physician. The holding, however, did
not make any distinction between factual data, opinions, or evaluations in the committee records.
95. Cases where federal jurisdiction is premised on federal questions present unique issues when
applying Indiana's peer review privilege statute. Because most negligent credentialing cases are
based on state law, it is beyond the scope of this note to extensively discuss the impact of the peer
review privilege on federal question litigation. However, a brief discussion of the federal case law
will be given.
Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, privileges in federal courts are determined
by the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States. FED. R. EVID. 501. In
applying Rule 501, the federal courts have utilized a four-part balancing test that weighs the
plaintiff's need to ascertain the truth against the defendant's need to protect confidentiality. See,
e.g., Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 113 F.R.D. 677 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (announcing the four-part test).
First, because privileges are not favored in the law, the court should narrowly construe them.
Id. at 679. Second, the court should weigh the need for truth against the policy sought to be
furthered by the privilege and consider whether recognition of the privilege would further that
policy. Id. Third, the court should evaluate whether the communication originated in confidence
that it would not be disclosed. Id. Last, the court must consider whether the relation sought to be
protected by the privilege is one that the community sedulously fosters. In the context of the peer
review privilege statute as applied to employment discrimination claims, the Doe court held that,
although the peer review privilege was very important to unbridled candor in the peer review
process, the need for the truth in cases where discrimination is alleged outweighs the policy
supporting the privilege. Id. at 679-80. In Schafer v. Parkview Memorial Hospital, Inc., 593 F.
Supp. 61 (N.D. Ind. 1984), the court applied a similar test in the context of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. Id. at 64.
Like the state courts, the federal courts have placed great emphasis on the policy supporting
the peer review privilege and on Indiana's decision to codify the privilege. See Doe, 113 F.R.D.
677 (N.D. Ind. 1987); see also Schafer, 593 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ind. 1984). Therefore, the federal
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B. The Case Law
In Parkview Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Pepple,96 the court of appeals held
that the privilege is not limited in application to medical malpractice claims, but
that it applies to all judicial or administrative proceedings." Later case law
following the Pepple holding applied the statute in wrongful discharge claims,"
negligent credentialing claims,"
antitrust actions, " discrimination
claims,'0 ' and products liability claims."
Older case law also held that there was no subject matter limitation on the
privilege, and that all proceedings, communications, and determinations
occurring during the peer review were privileged under the statute."0 3
However, the more recent case of Ray v. St. John's Health Care
° limited the application
Corporation"
of the privilege's confidentiality element
to three situations.0 5 The Ray court held that only communications involving

decisions have usually been in accord with the rationale in the state law decisions. However, the
Indiana Court of Appeals has explicitly rejected the federal balancing test, reasoning that a balancing
test would "strip away" the protection afforded to the peer review committee and thwart the
privilege. See Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1311 (Ind. App.
1988).
96. 483 N.E.2d 469 (Ind. App. 1985), affl'd, 511 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. App. 1987).
97. Id. at 470. In Pepple, Dr. Pepple sought judicial review of Parkview's adverse decision
regarding his recredentialing. Parkview filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit any witness,
party, or counsel from giving any testimony regarding any proceedings of, records of, or
determinations of the peer review committee. Id. at 469-70. In response, Dr. Pepple argued that
IND. CODE 34-4-12.6-2, which grants privilege and confidentiality to peer review records, only
applied to medical malpractice claims. Id. at 470. The court of appeals held that the statute
unambiguously applied to all judicial or administrative proceedings, and that if the legislature had
intended to limit the statute's application to medical malpractice cases, it could have done so. d.
at 470.
98. See id.; Frank v. Trustees of Orange County Hosp., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. App.
1988); Ray v. St. John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. App. 1991).
99. See Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1310, 1312 (Ind. App.
1988) (noting that the plaintiff alleged that Terre Haute Regional Hospital intentionally and
fraudulently retained a physician, despite the fact that he was unqualified and was performing
unnecessary surgeries).
100. See Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984).
101. See Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 113 F.R.D. 677 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that the peer
review privilege applied to a case of alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code).
102. See Community Hosp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 594 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. App. 1992) (holding that
the peer review privilege statute is applicable to an incident report needed to support a defense to
a products liability suit against the manufacturer of a neuromuscular stimulator).
103. See Frank v. Trustees of Orange County Hosp., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. App.
1988). The court of appeals gave the statute broad application by stating that it had no subject
matter limitation. Id.
104. 582 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. App. 1991).
105. Id. at 472.
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statements made pursuant to the review of patient care, the qualifications of a
staff physician, and the merits of a claim against a physician are privileged
under Indiana's statute."° The Ray court also held that the party asserting the
privilege must submit all of the requested documents to the trial judge for an in
camera inspection."0 7 The holdings of Ray marked a significant departure
from past cases that tended to give overbroad application to the peer review
privilege statute. Unfortunately, Ray's holdings did not provide much guidance
to trial court judges and future parties about what specific items are considered
privileged under the three-part test."5m
In Community Hospitals v. Medtronic, Inc.," the court of appeals held
that an incident report, which was submitted to a quality assurance committee,
was protected from discovery by the peer review privilege statute."' The
court reasoned that because the quality assurance committee was responsible for
the evaluation of patient care, any document submitted to it for that purpose
would be privileged."' Allowing the discovery of an incident report would
not require the disclosure of any committee member's opinions or
evaluations;" 2 yet, the court was still willing to protect the report.

106. Id. See also Keskin v. Munster Medical Research Found., 580 N.E.2d 354 (Ind. App.
1991) (limiting the scope of the privilege by holding that the peer review privilege statute does not
apply to contractual arrangements made by a hospital's board of directors).
107. Ray at 473-74. The party submitting the document for in camera inspection is required
to itemize each document, provide a factual summary of each document, and state why the document
should be considered privileged. Id. (citing Burr v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d
1250, 1255 (Ind. App. 1990)).
For another state that utilizes in camera inspection regarding peer review documents, see State
ex rel. Grandview Hospital & Medical Center v. Gorman, 554 N.E.2d 1297 (Ohio 1990) (holding
that where the plaintiff asserted that documents fell under an exception to the peer review privilege,
the trial court had clear authority to inspect the documents in camera to determine if the documents
were excepted).
108. For example, the Ray court made no attempt to distinguish between fact-sensitive and
opinion-sensitive materials. Ray v. St. John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. App.
1991).
109. 594 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. App. 1992).
110. Id. at 452. In Medironic, a patient was "overstimulated" by a neuromuscular stimulator
while he was an outpatient at Community Hospitals. Id. at 449-50. The complaint named the
manufacturer of the stimulator, Medtronic, and alleged a products liability claim. Id. at 450. As
a defense, Medtronic argued that Community Hospital was responsible for the injury. Id. at 450.
In the context of trying to prove its defense, Medtronic sought the incident report that was generated
by an employee of Community after the "overstimulation" occurred. Id. at 450.
111. Id. at 452.
112. Incident reports are generated in the course of concurrent as opposed to retrospective
review of medical care. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 652. They therefore do not contain
opinions as to the quality and care delivered in the past. See Davidson v. Light, 79 F.R.D. 137,
13940 (D. Colo. 1978) (holding that even when opinions were contained in an incident report, the
purpose of the report was particular to one patient, not to formulate general hospital policies; thus
no privilege attaches).
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Another example of the broad interpretation that the courts give to the peer
review privilege statute is Frank v. Trustees of Orange County Hospital,
Inc." 3 The Frank court held that informal conversations of the peer review
committee members conducted outside the formal peer review process were
privileged. 1 4 The Frank court reasoned that what transpired in the formal
committee process likely shaped the content of informal conversations." 5
Frank's holding and reasoning likely mean that a party may not even depose
committee members regarding their opinions formed independently of the peer
review process." 6 A court relying on Frank could reason that discovery of
informal conversations would allow a party to discover peer review information
indirectly, which could not be discovered directly.I"
Unlike some evidentiary privileges that may be waived without a written
waiver," 8 the peer review privilege may only be waived where the peer
review committee has executed a written waiver. " 9 The court of appeals, in
Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Basden,'m held that a written waiver
is necessary before peer review information may be used by a negligent
credentialing suit plaintiff despite the fact that some of the peer review
2
1
communications may have been viewed outside the committee process.'
Other Indiana cases have required a written waiver even where the peer review
committee records have been disclosed to the individual under investigation and
have become a matter of public record." = Where such widespread disclosure

113. 530 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. App. 1988).
114. See id. at 137. See also Ray v. St. John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. App.
1991). Although Ray narrowed the peer review privilege statute's application, it affirmed the
holding in Frank that private, informal conversations between committee members are still
privileged. Ray, 582 N.E.2d at 472.
115. Frank, 530 N.E.2d at 137.
116. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(c) (West Supp. 1992) permits the members of the peer

review committee to testify to matters within their personal knowledge, as long as they do not
disclose opinions that were formed as a result of the peer review process or any other proceedings
before the committee. Given the difficulty for an individual to separate opinions formed inside
versus outside the committee process, a court relying on Frank could hold that any opinions a
committee member had are privileged.
117. See Frank, 530 N.E.2d at 135.
118. For example, the attorney-client privilege may be waived when the client carelessly speaks
to the attorney within the hearing range of third parties. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 384-85 (2d ed. 1987). Also, the physician-patient privilege may be
waived when the patient puts his or her physical or mental state at issue when bringing suit against
another individual. See Collins v. Bair, 268 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1971).
119. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(h)-(i) (West Supp. 1992).
120. 524 N.E.2d 1306 (Ind. App. 1988).
121. Id. at 1312.
122. For example, in Stiller v. LaPorte Hospital, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. 1991), prior
to the filing of the suit, LaPorte's peer review committee's opinions, evaluations, and findings had
been revealed to Dr. Stiller on numerous occasions. After the case was filed in state court and was
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has already occurred, a waiver seems unnecessary. However, the language of
the peer review privilege statute requires a written waiver in all circumstances
before the records may be used by anyone, including a plaintiff in a negligent
credentialing suit.'2
Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Basden" is the only Indiana case
that has analyzed a claim of negligent credentialing in the context of the Indiana
peer review privilege statute. When decided, the holding in Basden gave new
guidance on the applicability of the privilege. First, the Basden court held that
application of the confidentiality portion of the peer review statute-unlike the
immunity provisions-was not dependant on good faith review by the
committee members."
Also, the court held that in cases where a prima facie
showing of fraud has been made, the peer review materials would lose their
protected status. 127
Basden also illustrates the broad interpretation that will be given to the
inclusiveness of the peer review statute. In denying the plaintiffs discovery
requests, the court refused discovery of information that in no way required
disclosure of peer review committee opinions or evaluations. The court
protected the discovery of hospital committee reports, which were available to
any member of the hospital staff." It further protected the identities of the

later appealed, the findings of the committee became public knowledge and part of a published
judicial opinion. However, when a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff, who was litigating against
Starke Memorial Hospital, tried to discover LaPorte's committee reports, Starke Memorial
successfully argued that the records were privileged because no written waiver had been executed
by LaPorte Hospital's peer review committee. See Miller v. Stiller, No. 64D02-9105-CT-1384V
(Porter Super. Ct. filed April 5, 1991).
123. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(h)-Ci) (West Supp. 1992).
124. 524 N.E.2d 1306 (Ind. App. 1988).
125. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-3 (West Supp. 1992).
126. Basden, 524 N.E.2d at 1310.
127. Id. Basden's holding represents a way for a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff to
circumvent the privilege by alleging fraud. Nevertheless, the plaintiff who attempts to prove fraud
will have difficulty establishing the prima facie elements of fraud. To sustain an action for fraud,
the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a material representation of a past
or existing fact was made that was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it, or else
recklessly made, and that another party did in fact rely on the representation and was induced
thereby to his detriment. Basden, 524 N.E.2d at 1310 (citing Plymale v. Upright, 419 N.E.2d 756,
760 (Ind. App. 1981)).
In a negligent credentialing case, a successful allegation of fraud would require a showing that
the peer review committee represented to the plaintiff that a physician was competent by granting
him or her hospital privileges when the hospital knew or should have known it was untrue, and that
the plaintiff relied on this fact and was induced to rely on the physician's competence, only to be
injured as a result of the physician's incompetence.
128. Appellee's Brief at 6, Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306 (Ind.
App. 1988) (No. 61AO1-8802-CV-43).
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people with whom the committee spoke when investigating the physician,29
whether action was taken against the physician as a result of the peer review
investigation,' 30 and what factors were considered in the peer review
process.13 ' None of these discovery requests required the disclosure of any
committee member's opinions or evaluations, yet the Basden court found the
above items to be privileged. If the purpose of the peer review privilege is to
protect opinions and evaluations, Basden's holding-which allows for the
protection of other information-is unnecessarily broad.
To summarize, the Indiana courts have clarified that the peer review
privilege statute applies to cases of negligent credentialing.' 32 In addition, the
33
courts have given broad interpretation to the language in the statute.
Furthermore, no case has ever specified in particular what types of evidence are
privileged, other than those records relating to the qualifications of a
physician." For a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff, these holdings mean
that the most relevant discovery requests that can be served on a hospital will
be challenged as privileged until the legislature clarifies the extent of the
privilege. '
V. CRITICISMS OF INDIANA'S PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE STATUTE

In addition to the hardship the peer review privilege statute poses for the
plaintiff in a negligent credentialing suit, Indiana's peer review privilege can be
criticized in several other respects. In general, the statute could be construed
as an indication that the law protects hospitals and physicians from liability, but
sacrifices the improvement of the quality of patient care that would occur
through the exposure of incompetency."'
The peer review privilege statute has several specific areas of concern.
First, the statute does not differentiate between materials that are purely factual

129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. at 7-8.
131. Id.at 8.
132. See Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306.
133. See Frank v. Trustees of Orange County Hosp., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. App. 1988)
(holding that private, informal conversations are privileged).
134. See Ray v. St. John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. App. 1991).
135. In Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1309 n.j (Ind. App.
1988), the court asserted that the amendment and revision of statutes is within the power of the
legislature such that the court would not rewrite the peer review privilege statute.
136. For an expression of the same view, see Goldberg, supra note 18, at 158. "If the peer
review privilege will allow institutional protection to become more important than the improvement
in the quality of patient care through the disclosure of unsafe practices, the law is indeed 'a ass-a
idiot'." Id.(citing CHARLES DICKENS, THE ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TWIST ch. 51 (1837-1838)).
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and materials that contain committee opinions and evaluations.' 37 Second,
physicians under investigation by a peer review committee can see committee
records and hear all charges and findings against them," 3 while a negligent
credentialing suit plaintiff is still denied access to the records. Third, even after
peer review information becomes public record, a plaintiff still needs a written
waiver from the committee before discovery and use of the records are
permitted."39 Fourth, persons appearing before the peer review committee are
Fifth, a
prohibited from voluntarily testifying about their own opinions."
hospital can use select peer review records for its own defense while denying the
plaintiff access to other peer review information. 41 Last, the peer review
statute potentially violates the Indiana Constitution. 42
A. Absence of a Distinction Between Fact and Opinion
Indiana's peer review privilege gives a general grant of privilege to all
proceedings, records, determinations of, and communications to a peer review
committee. 43 The statute does not distinguish between different types of
information, although peer review records usually contain information of many
types and from many different sources.'" Peer review records generally can
'Input'
be classified as input, deliberations, output, and procedures.145
describes information that enters the peer review records from outside sources,
and includes anything not generated by the committee itself. It may include
patient medical records, malpractice claims, applications for staff privileges,
utilization data, incident reports, reference letters, or verbal testimony.'
Input information is generated by outside sources and contains no committee
Therefore, the need to keep input
member opinions or evaluations.147
privileged is minimal.

137. The language defining which peer review committee materials are privileged states: "[N]o
records or determinations of, or communications to a peer review committee" are discoverable or
admissible. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(h) (West Supp. 1992).
138. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(d) (West Supp. 1992).
139. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(i) (West Supp. 1992). See also discussion infra part V.C.
140. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(c) (West Supp. 1992). See also discussion infra part V.D.
141. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-4 (West Supp. 1992). See also discussion infra part V.E.
142. See discussion infra part V.F.
143. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West Supp. 1992).
144. The records of the peer review committee typically include statistical data from in-house
investigations, incident reports, investigations of complaints, patient charts, references and
communications from other hospital peer review committees, applications for the granting or renewal
of hospital privileges, minutes of the committee meetings, memoranda to physicians or other hospital
boards, and written opinions and evaluations produced in the course of review. See Ward, supra
note 18, at 919.
145. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 626-28.
146. Id. at 626.
147. One exception to this assertion is where the input is from another peer review committee.
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The term 'deliberations' describes information generated during the peer
review process. Deliberations include minutes of the committee meetings,
verbal discussions during the meetings, memoranda to other hospital boards, and
written recommendations and opinions produced in the course of peer
review. " This type of information is "opinion sensitive" because it is
comprised of the committee members' criticisms of their fellow physicians'
professional competency. Disclosure of these records would likely discourage
physicians from participating in the peer review process; therefore, deliberations
are legitimately in need of the privilege.' 49
'Output' refers to the final product of the peer review process. It may
include written recommendations, minutes, or reports.15° Output represents
the final product of a peer review committee, which was derived from
committee member opinions and criticisms. Because committee members are
very interested in having their opinions protected, the output privilege is critical
in encouraging peer review participation.
Another type of peer review information is 'documentation', or evidence
of the procedures that a peer review committee follows when conducting peer
review.'5
Documentation includes the frequency and dates of evaluation of
a particular physician, the type of documents examined during peer review, the
types and names of outside sources the committee consulted, and any other
information related to peer review committee procedures.1 52
Procedural
information predominantly involves who, what, where, and when information
and is devoid of any opinion-sensitive information. Therefore, the need to keep
53
evidence related to peer review procedures privileged is limited.
Based on the above analysis, the only peer review information legitimately
in need of a privilege is material containing opinions or evaluations that were
generated by individual committee members or the committee as a whole."

148. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 626.
149. Information from other peer review committees does originate from an outside source, but
is more akin to deliberations-type information. It is generated by a peer review committee, albeit
a different committee, so the need to keep it privileged still exists.
150. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 626.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Southwick and Slee suggest that a hospital should be eager to disclose the procedures
undertaken by its peer review committee, especially when showing proof of JCAHO requirements,
state licensing requirements, and in defending against suits alleging negligence, antitrust, or wrongful
denial of staff privileges. Id. at 626-27.
154. See also Butler, supra note 3, at 107, for the proposition that minutes of the committee
meetings, correspondence between committee members relating to the review process, and final
committee product meet the general rule that the peer review privilege should only include
documents that have been "generated by a hospital committee for a hospital purpose."
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Therefore, because they contain opinions and evaluations, only deliberations and
output are in need of a privilege. Input and procedural information have no
legitimate need to be 'privileged because they contain only factual data, not
opinions. Thus, hospitals cannot argue that the sanctity of the peer review
committee would be threatened if a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff could
discover purely factual input and procedural information.
However, hospitals can assert the privilege for all materials in good faith
because the statutory language granting the privilege is so broad. Hospitals also
have the assurance that the courts will routinely rule in their favor for nondiscoverability. For a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff, broad protection
means that any discovery request that implicates anything remotely connected
to peer review will be objected to on the basis of the peer review privilege.
As an example of the broad objections hospitals have asserted, hospitals
have refused to answer discovery requests asking for the identities of the other
health care providers or entities who were consulted regarding an investigation
of a physician.'
They have also refused to reveal what criteria were used in
the evaluations process."
In addition, hospitals have objected to discovery
inquiries asking whether the hospital was aware of or had investigated pending
malpractice claims against the physician," 7 inquiries about what procedures
were followed during a given peer review session,"' s and inquiries into the
mechanisms that a hospital utilizes to monitor the outcome of surgeries
performed at that hospital. 59
Furthermore, hospitals have asserted the
privilege to questions asking whether the hospital had determined if a physician
was board certified,"W and have refused to divulge the type of hospital
privileges the physician had been granted. 6' Lastly, hospitals have refused

In some cases, disclosure of a particular piece of information may necessarily implicate the
source, and thus would be a disclosure of someone's opinion. The likelihood of this occurring is
minimal, but where it does, the party asserting the privilege should have the burden of showing that
disclosure would reveal the source.
155. Appellee's Brief at 7, Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1307 (Ind.
App. 1988) (No. 61A01-8802-CV-43) (asking whether the committee spoke with other physicians
outside the hospital).
156. Id. at 6 (asking what factors other than past peer review findings were considered in
deciding whether or not reappointment of staff privileges was desirable).
157. Miller v. Stiller, No. 64DO2-9105-CT-1384V (Porter Super. Ct. filed April 5, 1991).
158. Appellee's Brief at 7, Terre Haute Regional Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1307
(asking what the committee did to investigate unnecessary surgeries).
159. Miller v. Stiller, No. 64DO2-9105-CT-1384V (Porter Super. Ct. filed April 5, 1991).
160. Id. (asking whether the hospital learned whether physician was board certified in
orthopedic surgery).
161. Id.
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to disclose whether a hospital ever performed periodic peer review on a
physician,'62 if the hospital ever requested a curriculum vitae from the
physician, 63 or at what other hospitals the physician has or had hospital
privileges. "
A negligent credentialing suit plaintiff who is facing objections to this
"factual" information is forced to go through the unnecessary time and expense
of filing a motion to compel discovery, with little hope of success. A judge
considering a motion to compel on specific discovery requests has limited
guidance from either Indiana's statute or case law. Discovery rulings are

piecemeal, making results across the state inconsistent and unpredictable to the
litigants. "

B. Unequal Access to Peer Review Records
Indiana's statute also allows a physician who has been reviewed by a peer
review committee to see the committee records. 1" This exception to the peer
review privilege allows a health care provider under investigation to see, at any
time, the records accumulated by a peer review committee.' 67 The health care
provider is afforded the opportunity to appear before the committee with
representation, to hear all of the charges, and to offer rebuttal information.'"
Further, if disciplinary action could result from the investigation, the physician
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the peer review committee and an
appeal before the hospital governing board.'"

162. Deposition of Ernest W. Stiller, page 141 (December 11, 1991) (on file with Donald W.
Rice, Portage, Indiana).
163. Id. at 165 (asking whether the hospital, prior to or after grant of hospital privilege,
requested a curriculum vitae from physician).
164. Id. at 157. Some additional examples include whether action was taken against the
physician as a result of the peer review investigation, Appellee's Brief at 7-8, Terre Haute Regional
Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 130, and whether the physician was ever suspended or
terminated from a hospital. Id.; Deposition of Ernest W. Stiller, pages 135-36 (December 11, 1991)
(on file with Donald W. Rice, Portage, Indiana). Lastly, hospitals have objected to discovery of
whether, during the peer review process, a hospital asked the physician about any previous
suspensions from other hospitals, and whether any complaints about a physician had ever been made
by the hospital staff. Miller v. Stiller, No. 64DO2-9105-CT-1384V (Porter Super. Ct. filed April
5, 1991).
165. For an analysis of how the peer review statutes in Illinois, Florida, Pennsylvania,
Colorado, and California have been applied unpredictably by the courts, see generally James T.
Hicks, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Application of Peer Review Privilege Statutes, 24 J.
HEALTH & HosP. L. 137 (1991).
166. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West Supp. 1992).
167. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(d) (West Supp. 1992).
168. Id.
169. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(e) (West Supp. 1992).
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If a physician chooses to exercise this right under the statute, the opinions,
evaluations, and determinations of the peer review committee will be revealed
to that physician. The committee members are thus forced to confront their peer
with their opinions. At this juncture, the need for the privilege is virtually
eliminated; yet, the peer review privilege still prevents the discovery and use of
the disclosed information by anyone other than the peer review committee." T
For a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff, this exception may mean that relevant
evidence in the plaintiff's hands7 is inadmissable, even if a physician has already
had access to the information.1 1
C. Questionable Waiver Provisions
Under the current statute, a plaintiff can only discover or admit peer review
materials into evidence when the peer review committee holding the infohnation
executes a written waiver.1n
A written waiver is required even after
committee records have been revealed in other proceedings, court records, or

170. See Perrignon v. Bergen Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding that after
confidentiality is broken, the purpose of the privilege is defeated).
171. The following case serves as an example. In 1985, LaPorte Hospital began investigating
the professional competency of Dr. Ernest Stiller, a staff orthopedic surgeon. The proceedings of
the investigation and the findings against Dr. Stiller were published in the judicial opinion of Stiller
v. LaPorte Hospital, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. 1991). The appellate briefs of both Stiller and
LaPorte Hospital make it apparent that Dr. Stiller exercised his right to all evidentiary hearings and
that he was confronted by his peers, who were very critical of his professional competency. Id. at
101-02. Dr. Stiller was given copies of all the evidence the committee had collected against him,
including committee recommendationsand opinions. Appellee's Brief at appendix, Stiller v. LaPorte
Hosp., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. 1991). Thus, after all of the evidentiary hearings were
completed, the peer review opinions and evaluations were known by Dr. Stiller, eliminating the need
for the privilege. Furthermore, the findings against Dr. Stiller became public when the case went
to trial and was later appealed. See generally Stiller v. LaPorte Hosp., Inc., No. 86-513 (Stark Cir.
Ct. 1990) (trial court proceeding); Stiller, 570 N.E.2d at 99 (Ind. App. 1991) (appellate court
proceeding).
In a later negligent credentialing case, Miller v. Stiller, No. 64DO2-9105-CT-1384V (Porter
Super. Ct. filed April 5, 1991), the negligent credentialing suit plaintiff sought to use the information
from Stiller v. LaPorte Hospital as evidence that Starke Memorial negligently retained Dr. Stiller
despite his incompetency. In response, Starke Memorial asserted that the information was privileged
under the peer review privilege statute, and that because no waiver had been executed by LaPorte
Hospital, the information remained privileged. Id. Ultimately, the privilege was successfully
asserted by Starke Memorial against the plaintiff. See Miller v. Stiller, No. 64DO2-9105-CT-1384
V (Porter Super. Ct. filed April 5, 1991).
This situation has also surfaced in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Henry Mayo Newhall
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. App. 1978) (noting that despite
the fact that the transcript of the hospital proceedings against a physician had become public record,
the hospital successfully asserted the peer review privilege).
172. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(h), (i) (West Supp. 1992).
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73

Pursuant to the statute 74 and the case law, 75 the waiver provision
works a hardship on a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff. Once the peer
review committee records are disclosed to the physician under investigation and
after they have become a matter of public record, a negligent credentialing suit
plaintiff's use of the same evidence would not result in any of the harms that the
statute was designed to prevent. 76
In some instances, the peer review committee must disclose the information
involuntarily. For example, if a physician challenges a loss of hospital
privileges in a civil lawsuit, committee records necessarily will be introduced
into evidence by the physician and the hospital in proving the validity of the loss
of privileges. In this scenario, the committee can seek protective and restraining
orders to prevent a third party from using the disclosed information. However,
where a peer review committee fails to keep the information confidential, a
court should consider the privilege waived." 7 In addition, where a peer
review committee is careless and discloses information to a third party, the
privilege should be considered waived. 75

173. Again, the case of Miller v. Stiller, No. 64DO2-9105-CT-1384V(Porter Super. Ct. filed
April 5, 1991) serves as an illustration. Before the Miller case was initiated, Dr. Stiller was engaged
in litigation regarding the revocation of his privileges from LaPorte hospital. In the trial court stage,
and later in the appellate court decision of Stiller v. LaPorte Hospital, LaPorte Hospital used
information contained in the peer review records to support its claim that Dr. Stiller's discharge was
justified. See Stiller v. LaPorte Hosp., Inc., No. 86-513 (Stark Cir. Ct. 1990); Stiller v. LaPorte
Hosp., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. 1991). Thus, all of the evidence presented in court became
a matter of public record both in the lower court record and in the published appellate court
decision. However, although the information contained in Stiller became a matter of public record,
Starke Memorial Hospital successfully asserted that because LaPorte Hospital's peer review
committee did not execute a written waiver, the evidence contained in the prior court decision was
inadmissible. The negligent credentialing suit plaintiffwho was suing Starke Memorial Hospital was
thus unable to use any of the evidence used in Stiller v. LaPorteHospital to support her claim.
174. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West Supp. 1992).
175. In Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306 (Ind. App. 1988),
the court denied discovery of peer review documents where there had been no written waiver by the
hospital, even though peer review communications had been viewed outside the review process. Id.
at 1312.
176. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 157-58 (stating that once a physician is confronted by the
peer review committee, the need for confidentiality is dissipated, because both the physician and the
committee members have already been harmed by the disclosure).
177. See Salmonsen v. Brown, 309 N.Y.2d 535 (1970) (holding that a hospital's right to object
to production of peer review report was waived by failure to obtain a protective order or furnish an
excuse for not doing so).
178. This is the same rule that is applied to the attorney-client privilege. See supra note 118.
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D. The Prohibitionof Voluntary Testimony of Peer Review Committee
Participants
Under Indiana's peer review privilege statute, those attending a committee
79
proceeding may not testify about what they said to the committee.'
Moreover, a witness before a committee cannot testify about any opinion formed
as a result of the committee process. 8° However, the testimony or opinion
of an individual witness or a committee member can be characterized as input
to the committee, containing no opinions of any other committee members. 8'
Therefore, prohibiting individuals from voluntarily repeating their own opinions
does not promote the policy of keeping peer review committee members'
opinions confidential.
Contrary to the current statute, peer review committee members or those
providing the committee with information should be able to voluntarily testify
about their opinions of a physician that the committee has reviewed."
Voluntary testimony should be permitted as long as the opinions of the other
committee members are not revealed. Although the entire committee has the
responsibility for working, communicating, and interacting together, -the
privilege is not for the benefit of the committee as an entity, but for each
individual."8 3 Peer review committee members or other individuals may want
the opinions they gave to the peer review committee to be known to others,
especially if they feel strongly about a physician's incompetence. However, the
current statute prohibits voluntary testimony.

179. See IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(b), (c) (West Supp. 1992). For a partial text of the
statute, see supra note 84.
180. See id.
181. For a discussion of input, see supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
182. See West Covina Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1986). In West
Covina, the plaintiff brought suit against West Covina Hospital, alleging that the hospital had
negligently granted surgical privileges and retained an incompetent physician. Id. at 120. The
plaintiff sought the voluntary testimony of a physician who was a member of the hospital's peer
review committee. Id. The Supreme Court of California held that a peer review committee member
could waive the committee privilege and testify about the peer review committee proceedings. Id.
at 124. The court reasoned that although prohibiting compelled testimony is necessary to promote
candor and frankness in the peer review process, prohibiting voluntary testimony is not. Id.
183. For a discussion of how allowing voluntary testimony of individual committee members
threatens the sanctity of the peer review process, see generally Sosni N. Biricik, Note, Reconciling
Section 1157, Elam, .and West Covina Hospital: Is the Sanctity of the Hospital Peer Review
Committee Salvageable?, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1987) (analyzing California's peer review
privilege statute in light of West Covina Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 119 (Cal.
1986)).
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E. Unfair Use of Peer Review Committee Records
Under the current statute, a health care provider, a hospital, or the
hospital's governing board may use peer review information for its own legal
defense.'"
This exception has the possibility of creating a puzzling legal
situation. A plaintiff "85 may not discover any peer review information in any
pretrial procedures or at trial, but a hospital may use selected materials for its
own defense."
Thus, a hospital can invoke the privilege to conceal
information and can utilize the exception to the privilege for its own
advantage.' 7 In the context of a negligent credentialing suit, a hospital could
reveal selected peer review materials to refute a negligent credentialing suit
plaintiff's allegations, while using the privilege to hide information that shows
its own negligence."
F.

Potential State ConstitutionalViolations

While allowing aggrieved physicians to see committee records seriously
undermines the confidentiality of the peer review proceedings, such an
allowance is necessary to guard against federal and state due process claims

brought by physicians who allege that they were unfairly excluded from a
hospital.' 89 Discrimination in favor of allowing physicians to see committee
records while denying a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff access may violate

184. IND. CODE. ANN § 34-4-12.6.4(7) (West Supp. 1992). Although the statute allows
hospitals to use peer review records for internal business purposes, several appellate courts have had
available to them peer review committee records, suggesting that hospitals may use the records in
judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Stiller v. LaPorte Hosp., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. 1991)
(noting that hospital used committee records to show that its decision to revoke physician's hospital
privilege complied with hospital procedural and substantive by-laws). See also Pepple v. Parkview
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 511 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. App. 1987) (holding that the statute only allows peer
review committees to use peer review records for internal purposes, but recognizing that other courts
have had access to privileged communications).
185. The plaintiff may be either a patient alleging malpractice or negligent credentialing, or a
physician alleging wrongful discharge.
186. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 626-27 for other ways in which a hospital may
want to use peer review materials.
187. See Stiller v. LaPorte Hospital, 570 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. 1991) (noting that hospital
presented peer review evidence in its defense for revoking a physician's privileges).
188. See Ward, supra note 18, at 924; see generally Hall, supra note 17.
189. Due process is a special concern, especially when state run hospitals are involved. See
Goldberg, supra note 18, at 155. See also Frank v. Trustees of Orange County Hospital, Inc., 530
N.E.2d 135 (Ind. App. 1988) ("[The physician's right to see peer review documents] insure[s]
against arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable state action by a hospital .... Therefore the
granting of absolute privilege covering all communications during the peer review process does not
violate Frank's due process rights."). Id. at 138; Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1167 (111. 1984)
(holding that peer review privilege statute's validity would be questionable under the Due Process
Clause if the statutory exception that allows physicians to see peer review records did not exist).
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However, actual
the equal protection clause of Indiana's constitution.'
challenges to the peer review statute based on violations of equal protection
generally have been unsuccessful in other states.19'
First, physicians and negligent credentialing suit plaintiffs are not "similarly
situated." While a plaintiff has other evidence available to prove a negligent
credentialing claim, a physician who is challenging a discharge has as evidence
only the peer review records." 9 Second, there may be a "compelling interest"
in treating even similarly situated persons differently." 9 Improvement of the
level of medical care would likely be characterized by any court as a legitimate
goal of public policy in which Indiana would have a compelling interest."
Because the peer review privilege is necessary to encourage effective quality
control, a court would likely find the peer review privilege necessary for the
improvement of medical care. 95 Therefore, although an actual state equal
protection problem may exist, state constitutional challenges to the peer review
privilege based on denial of equal protection will likely be unsuccessful.
A plaintiff whose claim is effectively barred by the peer review privilege
may also be able to allege a denial of access to the courts in violation of the
Indiana Constitution.'" If a plaintiff is not able to discover any evidence

190. "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." IND. CONST. art.
I, § 23.
191. See Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (il1. 1984).
192. In Jenkins, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a physician alleging a due process claim
and a plaintiff alleging malpractice are not similarly situated. Id. at 1167. The court reasoned that
the discovery of peer review records is essential to prove a physician's due process claim, while a
malpractice plaintiff's claim can be proved without peer review records by using that plaintiff's own
medical records. Id.
However, if need for the peer review information determines whether parties are similarly
situated, a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff is very similarly situated to a physician who alleges
a violation of due process. Just as a physician needs to have the peer review records to show that
unfair procedures were used, a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff needs the records to show that
the peer review committee acted negligently.
193. See In re Terry, 329 N.E.2d 38 (Ind. 1975), ceri. denied, 423 U.S. 867. See also
Jenkins, 468 N.E.2d at 1166-67 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
312 (1976)); People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 414 N.E.2d 731 (Ill. 1980); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,
376 N.E.2d 1382 (Il1. 1978).
194. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 637.
195. Id.
196. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12, states that "[a]ll courts shall be open; and every person, for
injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.
Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily,
and without delay."
For a discussion on the constitutionality of peer review privilege statutes, see generally
Creech, supra note 58, at 209-10.
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relating to a physician's credentialing, the effect may be a complete bar to a
plaintiff's remedy."w
However, other courts interpreting constitutional
provisions similar to those of Indiana have opined that because the plaintiff can
acquire proof of negligence from other source, no denial of access exists.1"
The courts have held that the peer review privilege statute merely regulates a
negligent credentialing claim or have held that it has no effect at all on the
claim.1" While the peer review privilege statute may not rise to the level of
a constitutional denial of access, its limitations on discovery ultimately have such
an effect. '
VI.

REASONS WHY OTHER AVENUES OF

DISCOVERY

ARE INADEQUATE

Critics of peer review privilege reform have argued that other sources of
information are available to the plaintiff on which to base a claim of negligent
credentialing.? Therefore, the best way to alleviate negligent credentialing
suit plaintiffs' proof problems may be to force them to use circumstantial
evidence to prove their claims. By showing a court that ample evidence of a
physician's incompetence existed, a hospital could be proven negligent for not
thoroughly investigating the physician's professional competency.

197. The plaintiff in Miler v. Stiler, No. 64D02-9105-CT-1384V(Porter Super. Ct. filed April
5, 1991), lost to the defendant, Starke Memorial Hospital, on a motion for summary judgment.
Despite many discovery attempts, the plaintiff's expert witness did not have enough information on
which to render an opinion that would have effectively responded to the hospital's summary
judgment motion. In addition, the plaintiff sought an interlocutory appeal on the issue of the peer
review privilege, which the court of appeals declined to accept.
198. See Humana Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court, 742 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Ariz. 1987) (stating
that the peer review privilege statute did not abrogate the plaintiff's claim, but merely regulated it
because other evidence, such as what the hospital credentialing procedures were, testimony whether
or not they were followed, and other expert testimony, could be utilized byplaintiff to prove her
claim). See also Palm Beach Gardens Community Hosp. v. Shaw 446 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1167-68 (Ill. 1984) (holding that denial of peer
review information should have little impact on plaintiffs' ability to maintain their causes of action);
Snell v. Marshall Hosp., 204 Cal. Rptr. 200, 201-02 (Cal. App. 1984) (holding that, despite the fact
that the state of California recognized a cause of action for negligent credentialing, discovery of
privileged applications for hospital submitted to peer review committee would be valuable proof to
the plaintiff, and that denial of this request might require the plaintiff to abandon her remedy, denial
of discovery was proper because the peer review committee was a privileged group under California
law).
199. See supra note 198.
200. See Miller v. Stiller, No. 64D02-9105-CT-1384V (Porter Super. Ct. filed April 5, 1991).
After repeated discovery attempts that were denied based on the peer review privilege statute, the
plaintiff lost the defendant hospital on a motion for summary judgment. Id.
201. See Ward, supra note 18, at 199.
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A. Evidence of a Physician's Current Professional Status
A plaintiff could discover dismissals from other hospitals.' 2 However,
under the peer review privilege statute, Indiana hospitals are not required to
disclose whether they have revoked a physician's staff privileges. 3 When
faced with a discovery request, based on the peer review privilege, a hospital
may refuse to answer whether it dismissed a physician.'
Additionally, inadequate board certification2 5 may provide some evidence
of a hospital's negligence in granting a physician hospital privileges. In
response to whether a hospital learned of a physician's board certifications, a
negative answer may be evidence that the hospital is not screening carefully
enough, and an affirmative answer may show that the hospital negligently
granted staff privileges in the absence of board certification. However, a
hospital-by asserting the peer review privilege-may refuse to divulge whether
it learned of the physician's board certifications.' This impairs the plaintiff's
ability to prove either lack of screening or a negligent grant of staff privileges.
B. Evidence of Other Allegations of Malpractice or Wrongdoing Against a
Physician
A negligent credentialing suit plaintiff's discovery of other malpractice
actions" 7 would show a physician's pattern of negligence. A plaintiff could
contact the Indiana Department of Insurance for a certified record of all of the
malpractice claims that have been filed against the physician in Indiana."
However, unless a hospital will admit knowledge of malpractice actions or can
be charged with constructive notice, this evidence will be of minimal help to a
plaintiff. Furthermore, malpractice claims may only be pending, and-given our

202. See, e.g., Johnsonv. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 174 (Wise. 1981)
(noting that plaintiff inquired into whether surgical privileges at other hospitals had been limited or
revoked).
203. The statute says: "[T]he governing board of a hospital . . .may disclose the final action
taken with regard to a professional health care provider." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West
Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
204. See Appellee's Brief at 7-8, Terre Haute Regional Hosp. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1307
(Ind. App. 1988) (No 61A01-8802-CV-43).
205. See Miller v. Stiller, No. 64D02-9105-CT-1384V (Porter Super. Ct. filed April 5, 1991)
(noting that the plaintiff asked the hospital whether the physician was board certified).
206. See Miller v. Stiller, No. 64DO2-9105-CT-1384V(Porter Super. Ct. filed April 5, 1991).
207. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 343-45 (Ariz. App. 1972) (holding that
malpractice claims are admissible to show a hospital's notice of physician incompetence).
208. Indiana law requires that every medical malpractice complaint be filed with the Indiana
Insurance Commissioner. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-1 (West 1992). Certified copies of the
complaints may be requested from the Commissioner, and are to be taken as prima facie evidence
of the facts therein in all courts. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3-5 (West 1993).
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In addition, where a physician has only had privileges at one hospital,
where no injured patients have ever filed lawsuits against the physician, or
where physician misconduct is not well known, evidence surrounding prior acts
of misconduct may be unavailable. Often, the only way a plaintiff may be
successful in using circumstantial evidence is when the number of incidents of
prior misconduct is enormous and well documented by others. 1
Requiring
many prior acts of misconduct before a hospital can be held liable is an
extension of the notion that every dog is entitled to one bite; such a rule has
21
never been applied to dogs and certainly should not apply to physicians.
C. Testimony of Other Individuals
A plaintiff could also use as evidence the testimony of other patients injured
by the physician's negligence, 2 2 or the testimony of other hospital staff
members. However, staff members may be unwilling to testify or cooperate,
and the testimony of other patients may be unavailable.1 3 Procuring other
physicians on the hospital staff to testify against the physician may be
impossible, and peer review committee members are prohibited from testifying
regarding anything related to the peer review process. 214 Asking peer review
committee members about their individual opinions formed independent of peer
review proceedings may also be prohibited.2 5
D. Evidence in Other Patients' Medical Charts
Another approach to a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff's proof problems
may be to gain access to the medical records of the physician's other patients.
By showing that a physician had a pattern of negligently treating other patients,
a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff can show that a hospital knew or should
have known the physician was incompetent.2 1 6 The Indiana Supreme Court

209. See SMITH, supra note 42, § 3.03[2] at 3-19 (stating that the practicality of an approach
that finds a hospital liable for failing to investigate a single lawsuit is questionable given our litigious

society).
210. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 165-66.
211. Id. at 166.
212. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 344 (Ariz. App. 1972) (noting that previous
patients were called as witnesses).
213. See Ward, supra note 18, at 924-25.
214. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West Supp. 1992).
215. See Frank v. Trustees of Orange County Hosp., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. App. 1988)
(holding that informal conversations occurring outside the peer review process were not discoverable

because these conversations were likely shaped by what occurred during the peer review process).
216. See Ward, supra note 18, at 925.
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27
followed this approach in Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Trueblood. '
Despite claims that allowing discovery of non-party medical records would
violate the physician-patient privilege, 2t5 the Trueblood court sanctioned the
discovery of the non-party records where all information disclosing the identity
of the non-party was redacted from the records.21 9

Other patients' records may seem useful to a negligent credentialing suit
First,
plaintiff, but they do little to diminish a plaintiff's proof problems.'
the non-party medical records themselves are not evidence of prior acts of
malpractice, and without the testimony of the non-parties or without all of these
non-parties' other medical records, charging a hospital with notice of these
uncharged acts of malpractice would be difficult. Second, persons with first
hand knowledge about the non-party records, such as the patient and the treating
physician, will not be witnesses. Thus, a "battle of experts" will ensue with
each side's expert giving testimony about redacted medical records on patients
the experts have never seen nor treated." While this type of expert testimony
may allow a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff to survive a motion for
summary judgment, it will probably not be enough to carry the burden of proof
at trial.
E. Information Accumulated Pursuantto the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 19 8 6 ,m which creates a
national databank charged with tracking the professional competency of
physicians, also provides a possible means for a negligent credentialing suit

217. 600 N.E.2d 1358 (Ind. 1992). In Trueblood, the plaintiff claimed that the hospital was
negligent in reappointing an orthopedic surgeon, and was negligent in failing to supervise and
monitor him. Id. at 1359. The plaintiff also alleged that the hospital knew the physician was
performing unnecessary surgeries for financial gain. Id. To assist her in proving her claim, the
plaintiff sought to discover some of the medical records of the physician's former surgery patients.
218. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West 1983).
219. Id. at 1362. Similar approaches have been adopted by a few other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Ziegler v. Superior Court, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. App. 1982) (holding that plaintiff was entitled
to see records of former pacemaker patients); Community Hosp. Ass'n v. District Court, 570 P.2d
243 (Colo. 1977) (holding that medical records of neurosurgeon patients were discoverable);
Louisville General Hosp., Inc. v. Hellmann, 500 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. App. 1973) (noting that
emergency room records of former patients were ordered produced). See also Application of
American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989); Rudnick v. Superior Court, 523 P.2d 643
(Cal. App. 1974); Amisub, Inc., v. Kemper, 543 So. 2d 470 (Fla. App. 1989); Ventimiglia v.
Moffitt, 502 So. 2d 14 (Fla. App. 1986); State ,r. rel. Benoit v. Randall, 431 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.
1968); Osterman v. Ehrenworth, 256 A.2d 123 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969).
220. See Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d at 1362-63 (Shepard, C. J., dissenting).
221. See Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d at 1363 (Shepard, C. J., dissenting).
222. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1992).
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plaintiff to discover evidence of hospital negligence. Because the HCQIA
requires hospitals to access the databank when performing peer review, it
assumes that a hospital is presumed to know the information in the
A plaintiff litigating a malpractice action against a hospital can
databank.'
discover databank information, if evidence is submitted to the databank that a
hospital failed to request databank information as required by the HCQIA. h'
The evidence necessary to show hospital noncompliance is not specified in the
statute,225 but may include depositions, interrogatories, or admissions of noncompliance.226 However, a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff may be unable
to ascertain whether a hospital inquired into the databank, because the peer
an inquiry was made is
review committee may claim that disclosing whether
27
privileged under Indiana's peer review statute.
Even if a plaintiff can gain access to databank information, the information
may provide minimal help for a plaintiff in showing that a hospital was negligent
in granting a physician privileges at that hospital. One discharge from a hospital
or several malpractice judgments may not prove negligence on the part of a
In fact, the HCQIA regulations
hospital in granting privileges to a physician.'
specifically state that evidence of payment or settlement of a malpractice claim
is not to be taken as conclusive evidence that malpractice has occurred.229
In summary, under the current discovery avenues available, a negligent
credentialing suit plaintiff has a difficult time discovering any information with
which to prove his or her claim. Information related to the peer review process
is strictly privileged, and information from other sources is either unavailable
or of little use in proving a hospital's negligence. A hospital accused of failing

223. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(b) (1992). For an overview of the information contained in the
databank, see supra note 45.
224. 45 C.F.R. § 60.11 (1992). The code states in part:
Information in the databank will be available . . . to . . . an attorney, or individual
representing himself or herself, who has filed a medical malpractice action or claim in
a State or Federal court or other adjudicative body against a hospital, and who requests
information regarding a specific physician, dentist, or other health care practitioner who
is also named in the action or claim. Provided, that this information will be disclosed
only upon the submission of evidence that the hospital failed to request information from
the Data Bank as required by [the HCQIA], and may be used solely with respect to
litigation resulting from the action or claim against the hospital.
225. Stephen P. Nash et al., The NationalPractitionerData Bank: Legal Issues and Practical
Guidance on Compliance, in 1991 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 49, 64 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1991).
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
228. See Homer, supra note 70, at 485 (noting that proven malpractice claims are not evidence
of actual malpractice, only that a plaintiff was successful in persuading a sympathetic jury).
229. 45 C.F.R. 60.7(d) (1992).
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to carry out its duty to accredit only competent physicians should be eager to
exculpate itself by revealing its peer review records. 30 However, the plaintiff
carries the burden of proof, and hospitals will continue successfully to oppose
discovery requests under the broad umbrella of the peer review privilege statute
until the privilege is strictly defined.
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAT ARE UNDESIRABLE

A. Elimination of the Peer Review Privilege
The easiest way to remedy the problems that a negligent credentialing suit
plaintiff encounters by the application of the peer review privilege is to eliminate
the privilege. A plaintiff could be given access to all of the committee records
and discover the committee members' opinions, the opinions of other peer
review committees, the minutes of the committee meetings, and everything else
that the committee used in its evaluation process. Abrogation would force peer
review committees to perform their functions very carefully, because the
privilege shielding their conduct would be eliminated. Committees that perform
their functions effectively would not be threatened because they would have
nothing to hide from a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff. Total abrogation of
the privilege may not even have any effect on physicians choosing to participate
in peer review. For example, one Indiana physician chose to participate in peer
review even though he did not know that the peer review privilege existed. 31
However, the peer review privilege is still needed to encourage the day-today operations of peer review committees.
Without some guarantee of

230. The plaintiff in Basden v. Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc., 524 N.E.2d 1306 (Ind.
App. 1988), was of the opinion that the more a hospital opposes discovery requests, the more it is
admitting negligence.
Basden has alleged that [Terre Haute Regional Hospital] did not protect her from a
doctor who THRH knew was performing unnecessary surgeries . . . THRH professes
to have fulfilled its duty in extending privileges only to qualified, reputable physicians.
Given this assertion, one can only wonder why THRH does not request a waiver of the
peer review privilege and allow Basden access to the information which would exculpate
THRH. Apparently, THRH fears that release of the information will instead support
Basden's allegations. The peer review statute was not designed to protect hospitals from
fraudulent conduct in employing unqualified physicians and surgeons for their own
financial gain. If THRH is allowed to shield itself from liability by hiding behind the
peer review statute, THRH may continue conducting fraudulent peer review of its
physicians and surgeons. The price citizens of this State would pay for such deplorable
conduct is far too great.
Appellee's Brief, at 34-35.
231. Appellant's Brief at 29, Frank v. Orange County Hosp., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. App.
1988) (No. 88A01-8805-CV-149) (noting that the doctor was unaware of the privilege until shottly
before his deposition was taken by the malpractice plaintiff).
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privilege, no opinions or criticisms of incompetent physicians would ever be
expressed during the committee proceedings, malcing the peer review process a
complete nullity. Furthermore, because legislatures, the judiciary, and the
medical profession have seen peer review as a positive mechanism for policing
physician-owned health care entities, 2 elimination of the privilege would
prove an insurmountable task.
B. Use of a Balancing Test
Another possible alternative would be the implementation of a balancing test
similar to the one used in the federal courts under Federal Rule of Evidence
Rule 501. 3 A balancing approach would probably be the most flexible
because the nature of the discovery requests and the level of need the plaintiff
can demonstrate will be different in each case.'
As Rule 501 has been
interpreted by the case law, the applicability of the peer review privilege would
depend on the outcome of a four part test: the privilege should be construed
narrowly, should be applied only to further the privilege's policy, should be
applied only to information that originated with the assurance of non-disclosure,
and should be applied where the community
sedulously fosters the relationship
5
that the privilege intended to encourage.
First, the court would interpret the peer review privilege statute narrowly,
because evidentiary privileges are not favored, and, where applicable, they

232. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 625. Southwick and Slee note that the JCAHO
guidelines, state law regulating the licensure of hospitals and physicians, federal law requiring peer
review to review the appropriateness of Medicare services, and judicial decisions imposing liability
on hospitals for corporate negligence all are evidence that peer review is unavoidable. Id.
233. FED. R. EVID. 501. For a discussion of how the federal courts have applied the privilege
to federal question litigation, see supra note 95. Some states have used a balancing test to determine
the applicability of the peer review privilege. See, e.g., Bundy v. Sinopoli, 580 A.2d 1101 (N.J.L.
1990) (holding that the trial court must conduct an in camera inspection to determine the need for
hospital peer review committee records, balancing the extent that other information is available from
other sources, the degree of harm the plaintiff would suffer if denied discovery, and the possible
prejudice to the peer review committee). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1981). The statute
allows the discovery of peer review records when a showing of extraordinary necessity for them is
made. Id. Extraordinary necessity was shown in Scott v. Jackson, 596 A.2d 523, 525-26 (D.C.
1991) (finding an extraordinary showing of necessity in the case of malpractice where the act of
negligence took place over 10 years earlier, the hospital had destroyed records relating to negligent
act, the hospital had destroyed the personnel file of the physician who was responsible for the
negligent act, a witness had died, and memories of the incident had faded).
234. For a case that identifies the flexibility in the context of FED. R. EVID. 501, see Trammel
v. United States. 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (the purpose of Rule 501 is to permit flexibility in
developing the rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, leaving the door open to change).
235. See Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc., 113 F.R.D. 677, 679-80 (N.D. Ind. 1987); Schafer
v. Parkview Memorial Hosp., Inc., 593 F.Supp. 61 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
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should be construed narrowly.?6 For a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff,
this part of the test would favor freer access to the peer review records. A
court would allow discovery of anything unrelated to committee members'
opinions, and would allow discovery of peer review materials that had already
been disclosed.
Second, the court would weigh the need for truth against the policy sought
to be promoted by the privilege, and the likelihood that recognition of the
privilege would further that policy. 7 This analysis of the balancing test
would help the negligent credentialing suit plaintiff in several ways. First, the
need for truth would always be great where a plaintiff alleges that a peer review
committee-with the responsibility of carefully screening physicians-has
performed its duties negligently. Second, the balancing approach could be
tailored to the individual circumstances surrounding the objects of discovery.
Again, where a physician under review has seen the committee records or the
materials have become a matter of public record, the continued recognition of
the privilege would further no policy and the privilege would be inapplicable.
Third, the court would consider whether the communications originated in
a confidence warranting that they would not be disclosed.'
If Indiana were
to adopt a balancing test, confidentiality would not be guaranteed except in
unforeseeable situations where the test would balance in favor of confidentiality.
Therefore, the application of part three of the balancing test would weigh in
favor of discoverability. (,
Fourth, the court would consider whether the peer review privilege is
sedulously fostered by the community. 9 This part of the test would probably
weigh against a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff. Legislatures, the judiciary,
and the medical profession have recognized the need for a peer review
privilege.'
Based on peer review's wide acceptance, a court would likely
find that the community sedulously fosters the privilege.
While a balancing test is a feasible approach, it is undesirable. First, it
would lead to judicial uncertainty regarding the applicability of the privilege.
Discovery rulings would not be uniform or predictable" and would thus result

236. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
237. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 543 (7th Cir. 1977), certl. denied, 429 U.S. 820
(1978).
238. Schafer v. Parkview Memorial Hosp., Inc., 593 F.Supp. 61 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
239. Id.
240. See supra note 9.
241. See Southwick & Slee, supra note 6, at 639 (noting that uncertainties of judicial
application have surfaced in applying both legislative and common law peer review privileges,
resulting in unpredictable and surprising results).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss2/5

Kalas: Indiana's Peer Review Privilege Statute and Its Effect on a Claim

1993]

PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE STATUTE

451

in surprise and uncertainty to the litigants. Also, because the courts have
routinely given deference to the sanctity of the peer review process by making
all proceedings, records, and communications confidential, there would be little
likelihood that the courts would find the balance to be in favor of a negligent
credentialing suit plaintiff.
The best approach to reforming the peer review privilege is a legislative
statutory change. While reform by courts would chip away at the privilege in
a piecemeal fashion,2 2 a comprehensive statute would provide for
predictability. The judiciary would have better guidance in applying the
privilege, and the litigants would have a better understanding of how to shape
their requests and objections to discovery.
VIII. MODEL REVISIONS TO INDIANA'S PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE STATUTE

The following revisions to the Indiana peer review privilege statute provide
a functional approach to the peer review privilege. Persons supplying input to
the peer review committee would be assured that their opinions would remain
confidential when such a confidence is necessary. Furthermore, negligent
credentialing suit plaintiffs would be able to obtain and use evidence to enable
their experts to form an opinion about a hospital's negligence.
Model Statute 3
Immunity and Privileged Communications: Health Care
Provider Peer Review Committees
34-4-12.6-6-1 Definitions

(h) As used in this chapter, "work product" of a peer review committee refers
to any committee product produced by the committee itself that contains an
individual's opinion or any peer review committee's opinion related to the
qualifications of a health care provider, related to patient care rendered by a
professional health provider, or related to the merits of a complaint against a
health care provider, including:
(1) Any oral or written committee product obtained by a peer review

242. Other jurisdictions have taken a piecemeal approach, with mixed results. See supra note
165.
243. This model statute must be read in conjunction with the full text of the current peer review
statute. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-1-4 (West Supp. 1992). The model statute adds
provisions to the current statute and amends existing portions of the current statute.
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committee from another peer review committee as defined in IC 34-412.6-1(c) that was produced by that committee itself, and that contains
any individual's opinion or any peer review committee opinion related
to a health care provider's professional competency, related to patient
care rendered by a professional health provider, or related to the
merits of a complaint against a health care provider; and
(2) Any oral or written information submitted from third parties,
other than peer review committees, that contains opinions related to
the qualifications of a health care provider, related to patient care
rendered by a professional health provider, or related to the merits of
a complaint against a health care provider.
As used in this chapter, "work product" specifically excludes:
(1) The names and professional qualifications of those serving on the
peer review committee, past or present;
(2) The application for initial and renewal of hospital privileges
submitted by a health care provider;
(3) Written and oral statements made to a peer review committee by
a health care provider related to that health care provider's
professional competency;
(4) The written and unwritten procedures and policies that a peer
review committee follows in evaluating the professional competency
of a health care provider, in evaluating the patient care rendered by a
professional health care provider, or in evaluating the merits of a
complaint against a professional health care provider;
(5) Incident reports prepared in the routine course of the hospital's
business;
(6) Written or oral statements presented to a committee that contain
no opinions about the professional competency of a health care
provider, as to patient care rendered against a professional health care
provider, or as to the merits of a complaint against a professional
health care provider;
(7) The nature and extent of the hospital privileges that a health care
provider enjoys or has enjoyed at a health care facility;
(8)

The dates, nature, and extent that a health care provider's
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privileges at a health care facility were ever granted, denied,
suspended, revoked or limited;
(9) Information relating to the procedures that a peer review
committee followed with respect to conducting any peer review
procedure upon a health care provider, such as:
(A) the dates on which any peer review of a health care
provider was performed;
(B) the identities of the persons or organizations with whom
the peer review communicated concerning the professional
competency of a health care provider, concerning patient
care rendered by a professional heath care provider, or
concerning the merits of a complaint against a health care
provider, such as the Indiana Department of Insurance, other
hospitals, or other health care providers; or
(C) any other information relating to the steps a peer review
committee took in evaluating the professional competency of
a health care provider, in evaluating patient care rendered by
a health care provider, or in evaluating the merits of a
complaint against a health care provider; and
(10) Any other oral or written peer review information that contains
no opinions about the professional qualifications of a health care
provider, opinions about patient care rendered by a health care
provider, or opinions about the merit of a complaint against a health
care provider.
As used in this chapter, the definition of "opinion" does not include the nature
and extent that a health care provider's hospital privileges were ever granted,
denied, suspended, revoked or limited.
Commentary: This section is an addition to the definitional section of Indiana's
current peer review privilege statute. This addition codifies the distinction
between peer review information containing opinions, information that is purely
factual, information that is merely input, and information that reveals what
procedural steps a peer review committee followed. u 4 By listing specific

244. See supra part V.A. For additional jurisdictions that have recognized these distinctions,
see D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1981) (stating that written or oral statements presented to peer
review committee were not privileged); Hill v. Sandu, 129 F.R.D. 548 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that
documents submitted to peer review committee relating to the physician's award of staff privileges
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examples of items that are clearly not committee "work product," both the
parties to litigation and the judiciary will have a concrete understanding about
what constitutes privileged "work product."
Furthermore, by including "catch-all" provisions,' the statute allows the
judiciary some flexibility when handling unanticipated circumstances. Those
"catch-all" provisions also indicate to the litigants and the judiciary that the
examples given in the statute are not exhaustive.
The model scheme also assures peer review committee members and other
individuals that any opinions expressed during the peer review process will
remain completely confidential.'
At the same time, it allows for the
discovery of non-opinion sensitive information, giving negligent credentialing
suit plaintiffs the evidence they need. 7

were not privileged under statute); Porter v. Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 77 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding that
incident reports containing factual data were not privileged); John C. Lincoln Hosp. and Health
Center v. Superior Court, 768 P.2d 188 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that incident reports were
not privileged); Hinson v. Clairemont Community Hosp., 267 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that an otolaryngologist's application for staff privileges was not privileged because the
document was prepared by a physician, not by a peer review committee); Brown v. Superior Court,
200 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that discovery of the fact of whether a hospital
evaluated a physician was not a demand for contents of "proceedings or records" of peer review
evaluations and thus was not privileged under the peer review statute); Richter v. Diamond, 483
N.E.2d 1256 (III. 1985) (holding that whether a physician's privileges have been restricted and the
specific restrictions were not privileged information); Ekstrom v. Temple, 553 N.E.2d 424 (I11.Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that the identity of hospital infection control committee members and the
physician's application for hospital privileges were not privileged under the Medical Studies Act);
Willing v. St. Joseph Hosp. 531 N.E.2d 824 (Ii. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that records relating to
a physician's application for hospital privileges were not privileged); Byork v. Carmer, 487
N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding that information as to whether a hospital knew of
physician'sprior negligent acts was not privileged); Fowler v. Pirris, 34 Pa. D. & C. 3d. 530, 53638 (1981) (holding that a physician's application for hospital privilege and documents reflecting
committees review of the physician's qualification were not privileged under Pennsylvania's peer
review privilege act, construing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 425.4 (West Supp. 1992)); Barnes v.
Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1988) (holding that documents gratuitously submitted to peer
review committee were not privileged); Santa Rosa Medical Center v. Spears, 709 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that names and addresses of committee members were not privileged under
the privilege statute). But see Parker v. St. Claire's Hosp., 553 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (holding that a physician's initial application for privileges and subsequent application for
renewal of privileges were privileged under a statute prohibiting disclosure of "records relating to
performance of a medical or quality assurance review function").
245. See text of model statute 34-4-12.6-2(h)(9)(C) and (10).
246. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
247. See supra part V.A. and notes 132-35 and accompanying text.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss2/5

Kalas: Indiana's Peer Review Privilege Statute and Its Effect on a Claim

1993]

PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE STATUTE

455

34-4-12.6-2 Confidentiality and privilege?
(a) All work product, as defined in IC 34-4-12.6-1(h), of a peer review
committee shall be confidential. Neither the personnel of a peer review
committee nor any participant in a committee proceeding, except a health care
provider making oral or written statements to the peer review committee
regarding that health care provider's professional competency, shall reveal any
work product of a peer review committee outside the peer committee.
(b) Information that is otherwise discoverable or admissible from original
sources shall not be construed as immune from discovery or use in any
proceeding merely because it was presented during proceedings before a peer
review committee.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no person who attends a peer
review committee proceeding shall be required to disclose any knowledge of
work product acquired in connection with a peer review proceeding. If a person
in attendance at a peer review proceeding chooses to voluntarily disclose
committee work product, that person may disclose his or her input that was
given to the peer review committee and any opinions formed as a result of the
However, voluntary disclosure may not include
committee proceedings.
disclosing the opinions of the other committee members. Also, any person that
attends a peer review committee may not be prevented from testifying regarding
matters within the person's knowledge and in accordance with the other
provisions in the chapter.
Commentary: This section revises the current statute by eliminating the
prohibition on voluntary testimony by persons who attended a peer review
committee meeting. 9 Committee members that feel strongly about expressing
their own opinions and about expressing their personal reactions to committee
Furthermore, prohibiting the volunteers from
findings may testify.'
disclosing other peer review committee members' opinions assures those
members choosing not to disclose that their opinions will still be protected from
While it is an improvement on the current statute, some
disclosure."
disadvantages may still exist with this proposed revision.
Hospital peer review committees act under the authority of the hospital, and
the committee's members will likely look out for that hospital's best interests.

248. This section replaces IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1992). For a
comparison of this revision with the current code sections, see supra note 84.
249. See supra part V.D.
250. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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Thus, it is possible that only committee members with testimony favorable to the
hospital will be willing to testify voluntarily.u 2 However, at the same time,
a peer review committee member may be sympathetic to a plaintiff's case and
voluntarily testify, even to the hospital's detriment."
34-4-12.6-2 Confidentiality and privilege

(n) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a plaintiff may discover
oral or written peer review committee work product where:
(1) The plaintiff is bringing suit against a health care provider
alleging that the health care provider failed to exercise reasonable care
in initially granting a health care provider privileges at that health care
facility or in subsequently renewing that health care provider's
privileges; and
(2) The plaintiff is seeking committee work product relating to the
committee's investigation of a health care provider's professional
competency; and
(3) The health care provider has exercised his or her statutory rights
under IC 34-4-12.6-2(d)-(f).
(o) The work product discoverable in section (n) will only include oral or
written work product that was disclosed to a health care provider in an
evidentiary or other hearing pursuant to IC 34-4-12.6-2(d)-(f). In addition, the
plaintiff may only use the work product obtained under paragraph (n) for
purposes of the immediate suit against a health care provider that alleges that the
health care provider failed to exercise reasonable care in initially granting
hospital privileges to a health care provider or failed to exercise reasonable care
in subsequently renewing that health care provider's privileges.
Commentary: This addition to Indiana's statute would allow a negligent
credentialing suit plaintiff the same access to peer review records that a health
care provider possesses.'
The addition avoids continued application of the
privilege where a physician has already seen the peer review records, 255 and

252.
253.
254.
255.

See Morter, supra note 6, at 1135.
Id.
See supra part V.B.
See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
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thus effectively eliminates potential equal protection violations. 2-6 By limiting
the plaintiff's use of the work product to cases of negligent credentialing, it also
assures physicians on the peer review committee that what they contribute during
the peer review process will not be
beneficial to a plaintiff alleging malpractice
27
against an individual physician.
Where a plaintiff is suing both a hospital for negligent credentialing and a
physician for malpractice, the above approach may require that separate or
bifurcated trials be conducted.' However, the extra burden that may be
imposed on the litigants is preferable to total elimination of a valid claim of
negligent credentialing.
34-4-12.6-2 Confidentiality and privilege

(i) Except in such cases as are authorized in this chapter, the evidentiary
privileges created by this section shall be invoked by all witnesses and
organizations in all judicial and administrative proceedings unless the peer
review committee has executed a waiver. A waiver may occur:
(1) By execution of a written waiver on behalf of the committee
holding the privilege; or
(2) By intentional or negligent disclosure of peer review work product
to parties other than those entities listed in IC 34-4-12.6-(g).
In cases where anyone other than the members of a peer review committee, their
agents, or employees has submitted opinions about the professional competency
of a health care provider, about patient care rendered by a professional health
provider, or about the merits of a complaint against a health care provider,
waiver of the opinions submitted to the peer review committee may occur only
when that other person exercises a written waiver.

256. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
257. This approach is similar to the HCQIA requirements imposed on a malpractice plaintiff
who seeks information from the national databank. 42 U.S.C. § 11112 - 11157 (1992). Under the
HCQIA regulations, a plaintiff may discover information contained in the national databank if three
conditions are met. First, the plaintiff must be bringing suit against both a hospital and a physician.
Second, the plaintiff must show that the hospital did not comply with the HCQIA requirements that
the hospital must request information from the databank. Third, the plaintiff may only use the
information obtained against the hospital. 45 C.F.R. § 60.11 (1992).
258. A jury would have a difficult time using the peer review records against the hospital while
disregarding the records in determining the liability of the physician.
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Commentary: This amendment and addition to the Indiana statute allows a
plaintiff under certain conditions to use the peer review information without an
execution of a written waiver. 9 This section also has a special provision that
addresses information received by one peer review committee from another peer
review committee or another individual. In these cases, once third parties have
given information to a peer review committee, these third parties lose control
over the information that they have submitted. If the peer review committee
receiving the information is careless in disclosing the third-party information,
waiver should not be imputed to third parties. However, this special provision
will not prevent a waiver from occurring where an individual or other peer
review committee negligently discloses their own information.'
Collectively, the proposed statutory revisions and amendments address two
other problems associated with Indiana's current peer review privilege statute:
The unfair use of peer review information by hospitals"' and the potential
constitutional equal access violations. 2 Disparity in the use of peer review
information by hospitals, compared to the use by negligent credentialing suit
plaintiffs, is remedied by giving negligent credentialing suit plaintiffs greater
access to peer review information.
Greater access places a negligent
credentialing suit plaintiff on a more equal footing with a hospital regarding the
evidence available to each side.'
However, a hospital may still have a slight
evidentiary advantage in its ability to use committee "work product" for its legal
defense, as permitted by the statute.'
Even with this possible shortcoming,
however, the proposed revisions are a solution to the current statute's
deficiencies and their practical effects.
By allowing a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff greater access to peer
review records, the statute also gives a plaintiff with a negligent credentialing
claim greater access to the courts.'
Discovery of peer review facts and
opinions in compliance with the statutory revisions assures plaintiffs that they
will have enough evidence to prove their claims. Thus, a negligent credentialing
claim is less likely to be effectively blocked in violation of the Indiana
Constitution's "right of access to the courts" guarantee.'

259. See supra part V.C.
260. In other words, where an individual who submits information to a peer review committee
then negligently discloses this information to a third party, the fact that the same information was
presented before a peer review committee does not make waiver of the information dependant upon
the peer review committee's execution of a written waiver.
261. See supra part V.E.
262. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
264. See supra part V.E.
265. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
266. IND. CONST. art. I, § 12. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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In addition, the collective revisions also have the effect of improving the
effectiveness of peer review.'
By allowing a plaintiff with a negligent
credentialing claim greater access to peer review related materials, the chances
for a successful suit is greatly increased. The possibility of a provable case of
negligent credentialing will give hospitals more incentive to assure that their peer
review committees are operating effectively to eliminate incompetent physicians.
Where peer review committees are failing to fulfill their purposes, negligent
credentialing suit plaintiffs can act as an effective check on these
committees.2
IX.

CONCLUSION

Indiana's peer review privilege statute was enacted with the noble purpose
of improving the quality of health care in Indiana. In many instances the
privilege may be furthering this purpose. However, the broad interpretation
given to the privilege by the courts has expanded the privilege beyond its
necessary scope.
Revisions in Indiana's peer review privilege statute are needed to prevent
the peer review privilege from defeating the purpose for which it was enacted.
By protecting the "work product" of a peer review committee only where
absolutely necessary, peer review can still be carried out effectively and the
quality of medical care can still be improved. Moreover, the threat of a
provable negligent credentialing case will act as an additional incentive for
hospitals to make sure that their peer review committees are conscientiously
performing their review functions. Lastly, plaintiffs injured by physicians who
never should have had hospital privileges will have an effective remedy to
address their wrongs. Making a negligent credentialing suit plaintiff's case
easier to prove may indeed result in an increase in malpractice litigation.
However, the most logical way to cut down on the amount of malpractice
litigation is to cut down on the amount of malpractice. '
Jennifer J. Kalas

267. See supra part IMI.
268. See supra part M.
269. Adapted from Malpractice-Withor Without Insurance, SAT. REVIEW, March 20, 1976,
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